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THE MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACTSA SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
COMPARISON
0
GERALD W. HEANEY* AND ROBERT LATZ** I. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS
The message of President Eisenhower' to Congress with reference to the jurisdiction of Federal and State governments in LaborManagement Relations has served once again to focus the national
spotlight on this vexing question.
Pursuant to this message, Senator H. Alexander Smith introduced a bill incorporating this recommendation 2 and indicated that
further legislation would be introduced on receipt of a further message from the President.
The Presidential message, coming as it did, hard on the heels
of a Supreme Court decision, Garner v. Teamsters,3 which bars
action by state courts to restrain picketing which falls within the
province assigned to the NLRB by the Taft-Hartley Act even
though the court finds the conduct violates state law, gave rise to
extensive Congressional hearings on the problem. 4 The points of
view developed in the Congressional hearings, as a result of the
original message, can be briefly stated as follows:
The Secretary of Labor, speaking for the administration, did
not extend the views of the President.5
*M1ember of the Minnesota Bar.
**Senior Law Student-University of Minnesota.
1. January 11, 1954; H. R. Doc. No. 291, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
Speaking of jurisdiction, the President said,
"The act should make clear that the several States and Territories, when
confronted with emergencies endangering the health or safety of their
citizens, are not, through any conflict with the Federal law, actual or implied, deprived of the right to deal with such emergencies. The need for
clarification of jurisdiction between the Federal and the State and
Territorial governments in the labor-management field has lately been
emphasized by the broad implications of the most recent decision of the
Supreme Court dealing with this subject. The department and agency
heads concerned are, at my request, presently examining the various areas
in which conflicts of jurisdiction occur. When such examination is completed, I shall make my recommendations to the Congress for corrective
legislation."
2. S. 2650, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The Section relating to FederalState jurisdiction is as follows:
"(c) Nothing in this act shall be construed to nullify the power of any
state or territory to protect the health or safety of the people of such
State or Territory during emergencies resulting from labor disputes."
3. 346 U. S.485, 33 L. R. R. M. 2218 (1953).
4. Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
proposed revisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Part 6.
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1954).
5. "In one area of this broad field, there is a need for immediate action,
that is to clarify the rights of the States and Territories to deal with
emergencies affecting the health and safety of their citizens notwithstand-
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The National Labor Relations Board refused to give its views
on the subject.0
The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
expressed no opinion as to the merits of the proposal, but suggested
that it is absolutely necessary that Congress not only make its
desires crystal clear if conflict is to be avoided, but that it fully un7
derstand the implications of any legislation it considers.
Although no representatives of Minnesota appeared in the 1954
hearings, Harry Hanson, State Labor Conciliator of Minnesota,
made two recommendations during the 1953 Senate hearings.8
"We submit that the Congress should enact legislation providing
for the recognition of, and the adherence to, State laws calling
for conciliation or mediation of labor disputes before resorting
to strike action. And that is the most important thing, as far as
Minnesota is concerned; because the heart of our labor-relations law is conciliation, voluntary conciliation.
ing any conflict, actual or implied, with Federal law. The National Labor
Relations Act and the decisions of the courts, have had the apparent

effect of leaving the States powerless to deal with emergency strike situations which incidentally affect interstate commerce.
"S. 2650 contains a provision which is intended to clarify the powers of
the States and Territories in this area."
Hearings,supra note 4, at 2976.

6. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 277 (1954). But in a recent speech, Board member
Rogers proposed that jurisdiction of the Board should not be extended to
cases local in nature and impact. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 350 (1954)
7. The General Counsel suggested:
(1) That the states jurisdiction be exclusive.
"That would mean that the National Board would not be empowered to
take regulatory action with respect to such labor disputes in these States,
even where the national act would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
state regulation. This approach has certain obvious advantages in respect
to clarity of scope and avoidance of potential conflict, but it also has certain obvious disadvantages, particularly with respect to labor disputes
in multi-state industries and employer associations, which would be subject to diverse regulations with respect to a single controversy because of
the application of the Federal authority in some States and the application of separate and perhaps mutual inconsistent local authorities in
other states.
, 2) That the jurisdiction be concurrent
• ..In such event, I suggest it is important that Congress also make
clear whether it desires that the National Board shall be bound by the
determinations of the State authority. Thus, for example, if a State should
punish an employee for engaging in strike activities which it has forbidden under the authority of this section, is the National Board therefore
bound to determine in an unfair labor practice case that the employer was
free to discriminate against and need not reinstate the employee who
engaged in the activities which would otherwise be protected under
Federal law? Similarly, may the National Board require the employer,
under the Federal act, to bargain with the union which may have disqualified itself under State law? And, how does Congress desire that
such concurrent jurisdiction be applied in respect to labor disputes which
involve employees in a bargaining unit covering more than one State?"
Hearings,supra note 4, at 3506, 3507.
S. Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 613 Part 2 (1953).
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"We would further suggest that the Congress give the States
concurrent jurisdiction in the representation field, providing for
the exchange of information between the two agencies, so that
if the National Board chooses not to act the State will be free
to do so. A state certification would then have the same weight
and value as a National Board certification." (pp. 892, 893)
Both in his written statement and in his oral testimony, he went
considerably beyond these recommendations, and in substance
seemed to advocate that Minnesota courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal law and that they be permitted to enforce
the state law unless the rights were expressly protected under Section 7.
"I have but one message, and that is that Minnesota stands ready
to handle its own labor-management disputes effectively and expeditiously, if they are given a chance to do so." (p. 889)
"The state through its police power can regulate picketing that
results in violence or other tortuous acts but the State cannot
take any measures to prevent this picketing from taking place.
(We must wait until the horse is stolen before locking the
door.)" (p. 896)
"The local community bears the direct and immediate impact
of labor disputes. Yet they are left powerless to apply preventative remedial measures because the Federal Government has
preempted the field, not by an overt act on their part, but because of labor legislation designated to prevent the very situation that is (not) created. (p. 897)
"It is not the intention of this presentation to imply that the
State should have a free hand in the control of labor disputes
within its borders. If this were so, the right to bargain collectively, to strike, to select the union of their own choosing, could
be denied employees by anti-labor legislation of certain States.
The rights guaranteed employees under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act must be protected on a national level. State
laws would have to conform with the broad policy of the Federal
act." (p. 898)
Representatives of employers generally took a position in support of the President's recommendations, but indicated that in addition the authority of states to regulate strikes and picketing should
be extended. The more important recommendations were those of
the United States Chamber of Commerce ;9 the National Association
9. (1) "We are whole-heartedly in favor of what the President said on
the subject of Federal State authority."
(2) "We urge an amendment empowering the States to deal adequately
with such emergencies along the general lines of the Wisconsin statute

which was invalidated in this respect by the United States Supreme
Court in AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY AND MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF
AMERICA v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD (340 U.S. 383)."
Hearings,supra note 4, at 3025.
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of Manufacturers,'0 and the Council of State Chambers of Commerce. 1
A significant distinction between the position of the Chamber
and the NAM is that the Chamber recommended that the states
be permitted to impose compulsory arbitration if they desire or to
have State Fact Finding Commissions make recommendations for
the settlement of disputes. The NAM recommended that the states
be given the right to limit, regulate or prohibit strikes but wanted to
restrict the rights of the states to impose recommendations for the
settlement of disputes.
The National Auto Dealers Association proposed an exemption
10. "We feel that legislative action is required to assure to the States
and Territories the authority to deal with State Emergencies even though
such matters also be subject to federal statutes.
"It is recommended that legislation be enacted establishing the authority
of the several States and Territories to regulate or restrict strikes,
picketing, or boycotts, in line with their obligation to protect the health
and safety of their citizens. It is further recommended that such changes
should not result in imposition of, or recommendations for settlement
of labor disputes."
Hearings, supra note 4, at 3541-3542.
11. Hearings,supra note 4 at 3380.
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947.
"After Section 503 insert:
"Sec. 504. Nothing herein shall be constructed as limiting the right of
any State or Territory to give effect to any statute or to the common law
thereof pertaining to:
'(a) Crime, misdemeanors and other breaches of the peace,
'(b) Interruptions by strikes or lockouts, or threats thereof, of services essential to the health or safety of the citizens of such State or
Territory,
'(c) Enforcement of collective bargaining contracts,
'(d) Trespass, duress, coercion, or fraud,
'(e) Recognition picketing by a minority union,
'(f ) Secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes,
'(g) Strikes by requiring a vote to authorize,
'(h) Picketing by non-employees,
'( i ) Picketing in the absence of a labor dispute,
'(j) Picketing in homes.'"
(p. 3381)
"S. 1161, introduced in the last session by Senator Goldwater, seeks to
accomplish the same purposes as the subject amendment. It reads as
follows:
" 'Sec. 14(c) Nothing in this act shall be construed to nullify the power
of any State or Territory to regulate or qualify the right of employees
to strike or picket.'"
Support for this position was also received from the American Mining
Congress (p. 3330), from the National Association of Home Builders (p.
3563), the Illinois Manufacturing Association (p. 3609), the Southern Coal
Producers Association, the American Trucking Association (p. 3344) and
others.
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to the Taft-Hartley Act patterned after the retail establishment
exemption in the Wage and Hour Law. 12
The recommendations of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association, with respect to the President's recommendations, while
generally paralleling those of other employers, made a very pertinent
analysis :12
"What is intended by the proposal isn't too clear. Some have to
read into the proposal an intention to restore to the States the
power to regulate strikes in public utilities."
"The proposed addition can be interpreted to mean whatever the
reader wants it to mean.
"It can be construed as an intent to restore to the States their
power to deal with labor disputes in public utilities or other industries where the health or safety of their citizens are concerned.
"On the other hand, it can be construed as nothing more than an
acknowledgement (or restatement) of the police powers reserved
to the States to deal with labor disputes when they get out of
hand (mass picketing, obstructing streets, or highways, picketing homes, etc.). The Supreme Court has always carefully
pointed out in its decisions that those police powers continue to
be reserved to the States.
"The language employed in the proposal is almost too simple. It
raises new questions in a field that is already plagued by too
many that are unanswered.
"Incidentally, can we consistently oppose compulsion at the national level whether by arbitration or panel recommendation in
emergency situations which affect the safety or health of the Nation as a whole but insist that the States be free to substitute
such compulsion for the right to strike or boycott in emergency
situations which affect the State and health?" (p. 3718)
The labor organizations generally took the point of view that the
supremacy of the federal authority to regulate strikes and picketing
should not be disturbed; that what was really involved was compulsory arbitration in public utilities, to which they were unequivocally opposed, and that no legislation was needed to protect
persons or public property from violence.14 The CIO position was
stated by Arthur Goldberg, General Counsel of the CIO.
12. "Any retail or service establishment, more than 50 per cent of which
establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is made

within the State in which the establishment is located. A 'retail or
service establishment' shall mean an establishment of 75 per cent of
whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or of both)

is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the
particular industry." Hearings,mipra note 4, at 3560.

13. Hearings,supra note 4, at 3691.

14. The CIO, through their general counsel, took the position that what
was really involved in the Smith Bill was:
... whether or not compulsory arbitration should be imposed on a
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"THE CHAIRMAN. Does that mean, Mr. Goldberg, that you
think we should have a Federal law definitely forbiding compulsory arbitration under all circumstances, irrespective of any
situation that might arise in the State?
"Mr. GOLDBERG. I think that when the Taft-Hartley was
adopted, Senator Smith, that is exactly what was done. The thing
that won this case in the Supreme Court, in my opinion, above
all other things- and I speak with a little authority because I
argued the Wisconsin Utility Case in the Supreme Court -was
the fact that Senator Taft, who led the Taft-Hartley bill on the
floor of the Senate, said that as a matter of labor policy it was
better to have collective bargaining, including the right to strike,
in these types of disputes rather than to have compulsory arbitration, because the evils and dangers of imposing compulsory
arbitration were greater than the evils and dangers that were
involved in permitting the right to strike in this particular type
of situation." (p. 3108)
George Meaney, President of the A. F. of L. stated:
"This is a very dangerous provision which would allow hostile
State courts and authorities to exercise jurisdiction over labor
disputes in commerce, as long as an 'emergency' could be found.
What in an emergency? What are the essentials that must be
present to constitute an emergency? Who prescribes it? Is it the
governor or may any State court so declare? The amendment
does not indicate. Instead the language used is extremely vague
and affords opportunity for very grave abuse." (p. 3595)
Beatrice Lampert, representing the Labor Relations Committee
of the National Association of Attorneys General, opposed the
President's recommendation and requested a provision which would
in effect give concurrent jurisdiction to state labor boards as well
as state courts. 5 The text of the provision suggested was:
"Nothing herein shall be deemed to deprive States of jurisdiction
to enforce laws and regulations not inconsistent with this law
large segment of American industry as a substitute for collective bargaining in the resolution of labor disputes.
"This provision sounds as if its purpose were to enable the States to
exercise their traditional and legitimate police powers to protect persons
or private property from violence. However, when we examine the present
state of the Supreme Court decisions on this subject, we discover that the
States possess this power now, that that cannot be the purpose of this
proposal.
"Its effect, however, is to legalize State laws which under the guise of
dealing with local emergencies, prohibit strikes and provide for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes." Hearings,supra note 4, at 3108.
15. "Mrs. Lampert. You are right, Senator. That is exactly the position
that the National Association of Attorneys General is taking. They fear
that the passage of this particular amendment, or this particular provision, which is in the bill now before our committee, is not enough,
and that indeed if it was passed it might be so construed as to express
the congressional intent that States could act in no other circumstances
excepting the ones described in that provision and that it might be so
narrowly construed as to cover such a minute area of labor relations as
to be practically useless." Hearings,supra note 4, at 3436.
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unless jurisdiction of the same controversy involving the same
parties and issues shall have been undertaken by the National
Labor Relations Board or other Federal agency designated in
the act." (p. 3420)
She stressed that the purpose of the LMRA could be more effectively accomplished by supplemental regulations of the 48 states
because:
"1. The Federal agency, no matter how expert, is too remote
from the average community to have knowledge of, or sympathy
with, the variables which call for some flexibility in administration.
"2. The Federal agency must cover such a vast field that a certain amount of regimentation in administration is essential to coordinate fieldworkers.
"3. The Federal agency, with the necessary correlation between Washington and the Field, acts far more slowly than
local agencies.
"4. No matter how expert the agency, its facilities and resources are not adequate to take every labor question which
might arise." (p. 3421)
The position advocated by the attorneys general was more
thoroughly explained in the 1953 Senate hearings by L. E. Gooding, Chairman, Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Madison:
"We believe that there should be concurrent jurisdiction.
Whether or not the activity is prohibited by the Federal law,
we believe that if it is prohibited by the State law, the State
should have power in the first instance to go in there and attempt to regulate and prevent illegal activities. If, subsequently,
the Federal Government comes into the case, no harm has been
done anyway." (p. 902)
The New York State Labor Relations Board took an entirely
different approach.1 6 It proposed:
"The right to decline jurisdiction should be expressly embodied
in the act, so that there may be no question as to the propriety of
such action by the National Board.
16. The New York view was specifically attacked by Gooding of
Wisconsin:
"That, in my opinion, just goes backward. They say first that the national board must decline jurisdiction. Well, if the State waited until the
national board declined jurisdiction in the individual case, they might
wait 6 or 8 months or a year before the board determined, as a matter
of fact, whether or not it did have jurisdiction. On the cession proposition, in those states that have no labor boards, there is nobody to cede to,
'We think that the proper approach is to let the State assume jurisdiction,
and then if the National Labor Relations Board comes in with an assumption of jurisdiction and makes an order contrary to the other made by
the Wisconsin Board, or by the local State board, that order unquestionably, in a case where they had jurisdiction, would supersede the order
made by the State board."' Hearings,supra note 8, at 904.
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"Second, in order to avoid a 'no-man's land,' the States should
be free to act in labor disputes over which the National Board
has but declines to assert jurisdiction.
"Third, the National Board should be empowered, in its discretion, to cede jurisdiction over cases, or categories of cases,
which it might otherwise process, to appropriate State or Territorial agencies. A broad discretionary power vested in the
National Board should be substituted for the present rigid and
inflexible requirement of absolute consistency contained in the
present section 10(a)." (p. 869)
It stated that the bill introduced by Senator Ives in the 1953
Session, Sen. 1264, would accomplish these objectives.
Judging from the measure passed out of committee a great deal
of weight was given to the views of Archibald Cox, Professor of
Law at Harvard. He stated:
"The special circumstances arising when a labor dispute threatens an imminent local public emergency justify a narrow exception along the lines recommended in the President's message and embodied in S.2560.
"There are two respects in which the proposed amendment
could be improved. In its present form it leaves open the possibility of a conflict between State and Federal authorities, the
former acting pursuant to a State statute and the latter pursuant to sections 206-10 of title II of the Labor-Management
Relations Act. Conflict or duplication might well complicate
the handling of a dispute. The proposed amendment should
therefore be revised to make it plain that upon the President's
appointing a board of inquiry under section 206, the authority
of a State shall terminate.
"It might also be wise to include a more specific definition of the
kind of emergencies in which State intervention is authorized;
otherwise there will be the danger of stretching the exception
beyond its true intent." (pp. 3402, 3403)
He made it very clear, however, that as a general rule he was
not in sympathy with those advocating concurrent jurisdiction.
"The two governments should never exercise concurrent jurisdiction over labor relations ... Congress must decide not only

how far employer and union conduct should be regulated but
also how far it should be free. Both decisions affect the way
collective bargaining works. Conversely, the Taft-Hartley restrictions on strikes and secondary boycotts required drawing
a line between the practices to be outlawed and the freedom to
be allowed. All these issues are far too delicately balanced to
permit the States to impose additional obligations on employers,
employees or labor unions." (p. 3403)
The measure, as finally passed out of the Senate Labor Committee by a seven to six vote appears to be substantially in accord
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with the views of Professor Cox and the New York Labor Relations Board.
The Committee limited state intervention to emergency disputes which, if permitted to continue, "will constitute a clear and
present danger to the health or safety of the people of the state."
The text of the Bill is :17
"Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act is redesignated
'6(a)' and a new subsection is added thereto reading as follows:
"
'(b) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute where, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.
c
'(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar
any agency, or the courts of any State or Territory, from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over
which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
subsection, to assert jurisdiction.'
"A new subsection '(c)' is added to section 14, reading as follows:
"
'(c) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to interfere
with the enactment and enforcement by the States of laws to
deal in emergencies with labor disputes which, if permitted to
occur or continue, will constitute a clear and present danger
to the health or safety of the people of the State: Provided, That
no State shall be authorized by this subsection to take action
in any labor dispute in which the Federal Government is acting pursuant to sections 206 to 210, inclusive, of this Act. As
used in this subsection, the term 'State' shall include any Territory of the United States."
Subsequent to the approval of these amendments by the Senate
Labor Committee, it was indicated by members of the minority
that they were not satisfied with these amendments, and it was
indicated by at least one member of the majority that he too was
dissatisfied with the amendments and felt that a broader measure
permitting the states to regulate the right to strike or picket should
be passed by the Senate.' 8
It now seems quite clear that the problem will not be solved in
this session of Congress, since the Senate voted to send the proposed changes back to committee and Republican congressional
leaders have indicated an abandonment of any further plans to
revise the Federal Act at this session of Congress. 9
It is the purpose of this article to study the operations of both
17. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 426 (1954).
18. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 412 (1954).
19. Minneapolis Star, May 10, 1954, p. 1, col. 8.
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laws in Minnesota; to make a close analysis of the Acts; to point
out their differences and to re-examine the Minnesota Act 20 for
the purpose of determining which of the provisions of the Minnesota Act can be constitutionally applied to industries in interstate
commerce in the light of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions and the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. It is
hoped that this article not only will give a clearer understanding
of the present status of the Minnesota law, but that it will help in
determining the direction in which it is wise to proceed if free collective bargaining is to be encouraged.
II.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL ACT AND THE
MINNESOTA ACT

There are a number of basic differences in concept or approach
between the Federal Act and the Minnesota Act which should be
thoroughly understood before attempting to analyze the differences
on a section by section basis:
(1) The concept under the Minnesota Act of considering certain unfair labor practices unlawful acts.
(2) The concept under the Minnesota Act of holding an individual employee, as distinguished from a labor organization, guilty
of unfair labor practices and unlawful acts, and liable in suits for
damages.
(3) The concept under the Minnesota Act of court handling of
unfair labor practices as distinguished from handling by administrative tribunals.
(4) The concept of granting practically unlimited powers to
the State Labor Conciliator and permitting extremely broad discretion in their exercise.
(5) The combination under the Minnesota Act of mediation
and conciliation functions in the hands of the persons responsible
for the administration of the certification and unfair practices sections of the law.
A. Definitions
The definitions contained in the Minnesota Act are substantially the same as those contained in the Federal Act with a few significant exceptions.
20. References herein to the Minnesota Act shall be to Minn. Stat.
§§ 179.01-179.07; and 540.151-540.153 (1953). References to the Federal Act
shall be to the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C.
§ 151 et seq. (1946), as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended 29 U. S. C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp.
1952).
Specific section numbers of both acts shall be cited without repetition of
their full statutory citations.
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1. Employer
The Minnesota Act defines employer as including "...
all
persons employing others and all persons acting in the interest of
an employer... ." [Emphasis added] The Federal Act -2 defines an
employer as "..
any person acting as an agent of an employer,
21

directly or indirectly ......

Prior to the 1947 amendments to the Federal Act it defined
an employer as ".

.

. any person acting in the interest of an em-

ployer." The purpose behind the amendment was to make the
ordinary rules of agency applicable to employers. 23 In view of the
fact that this provision remains in the Minnesota Act the scope
of the Minnesota Act in this respect would appear to be broader.
The absence of the words "directly or indirectly" in the Minnesota
Act would not appear to be significant.
2. Employee
Individuals having the status of an independent contractor or a
supervisor are not expressly excluded from being considered employees under the Minnesota Act 24 as they are under the Federal
Act.2 5 In view of the fact that they do not fall within the accepted
definition of an employee, however, they are as a matter of practice
not considered employees.2 6 Supervisory employees are specifically
excluded under the Minnesota Act from consideration in the selection of a bargaining agent.2 7 The Federal Act provides that supervisors may become members of a union, but also provides that no
employer shall be "compelled" to treat such supervisor as an em21. § 179.01(3).

22. §2(2).
23. H. R. Rep. No. 245 on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1947);
93 Cong. Rec. 6858-6859 (1947). This amendment was intended to change the
rule in International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72
(1940), that an employer is responsible for the actions of his supervisors and
foremen even though he might not be under strict common law rules of
agency. H. R. Minority Rep. No. 245 on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
359 (1947). The House Minority Report, supra, feared that the change would
make necessary proof of specific authorization by the employer to engage
in the unfair labor practice before responsibility would be imputed back to
him. But this fear was unfounded, since the NLRB has held, subsequent to
the amendment, that an employer is responsible for the unfair labor practices
of supervisors whether or not specifically authorized, particularly in the
absence of any attempt on the employer's part to halt or disavow such conduct. Jewell, Inc., 99 N. L. R. B. 61, 30 L. Rl R. M. 1033 (1952) ; Edwards
Bros., Inc. 95 N. L. R. B. 1451, 28 L. R. R. M. 1458 (1951).
24. § 179.01(4).
25. § 2(3).
26. In re Pine County Dairy Cooperative & Dairy Employees Union,
Local 32, Notice No. 1268D (Minn. Div. Concil. 1953).
27. § 179.16. See Section on Appropriate Unit for discussion of plant
guards and professional employees.

1954]
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ployee for the purpose of any national or local law relating to
collective bargaining.2 8
The use of "compelled" would seem to give the employer the
right to treat a supervisor who has joined a union the same as any
other employee, for collective bargaining purposes.
As noted, Section 14(a) states that no "local law" can compel
an employer to treat a supervisor as an employee. This would serve
specifically to prevent employers dealing in interstate commerce
from so doing even if the state law included supervisors within its
coverage. As we have seen, the question does not arise in Minnesota, since the Minnesota Act does exclude supervisors.
B. Collective Bargaining,Strike and Lock Out Notices,
Conciliation.
There are a number of material differences between the Minnesota Act and the Federal Act with respect to the various steps
and procedures to be followed by the parties to a labor dispute.
There are also important differences in consequences resulting from
the failure to follow the required steps.
1. Notices to OtherParties.
The State Act requires a 10 day written notice to the opposing
party of intent to change an existing agreement, or to make any
change in rates of pay, rules or working conditions. The Federal
Act requires that a 60-day notice be given. 30
The Minnesota Act also differs from the Federal Act in that it
applies whether a change is sought in an existing contract or there
is a desire to negotiate a contract for the first time; while the Federal Act requires a notice only where there is present a collective
bargaining agreement between the parties.
20

2. Notices to the State or Federal Conciliation Services.
The Minnesota Act requires that a 10-day notice of strike or
lockout be given to the opposing party and to the State Labor Conciliator.3 1
The Federal Act does not require that a strike notice be given
but does require that a 30-day notice of the existence of a dispute be
28. § 14(a).
29. § 179.06(1).

30. § 8(d) (1). A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit, United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 210 F. 2d 325, 33 L. R. R.
M. 2530 (8th Cir. 1954), 38 Minn. L. Rev. 886, extends the meaning of this
section by holding that a union is forbidden to strike during the term
of a contract even after expiration of the 60 day notice, though the contract
contains neither a no-strike or lockout clause nor an arbitration clause.

31.

§ 179.06(1).
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given the United States Mediation and Conciliation Service and a
2
copy thereof to the State Labor Conciliator.1
Under the Minnesota Act the State Labor Conciliator is not per.
mitted to step into a dispute on his own motion as is the United
States Mediation and Conciliation Service under the Federal Act.3
Under a recent amendment to the Minnesota Act, however, either
party may invoke the services of the State Labor Conciliator by
34
filing an assistance notice.
3. Consequences of the Failureto Comply with the Provisions
Respecting Strike Notices and Notices of Dispute.
Under the Minnesota Act,33 it is an unfair labor practice and an

unlawful act if a strike or lockout is instituted without complying
with its provisions. Under the Federal Act, 36 it is an unfair labor
practice to institute a strike without complying with the notice provisions of the Act. It is not an unlawful act. Individuals who participate in a strike, however, which was instituted without complying with the notice requirements of the Federal Act, lose their
status as employees.

37

Under the State Act3" the jurisdiction of the State Labor Conciliator can be invoked during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement to assist in the adjustment of grievances. Under the
Federal Act3 9, the United States Mediation and Conciliation Service
may come into a dispute at any time but they are directed to intervene in the setlement of grievances only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
Under the terms of both the State and Federal Acts, a duty is
created to meet with the respective conciliation services whenever a
dispute arises over the terms or application of a collective bargaining
agreement and such dispute is not settled by conferences between the
parties. 40 Neither act is clear as to what the consequences are if
either of the parties fail to respond to a request for such a conference. 41
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

§ 8(d) (1).
§ 203(b).
§ 179.06(2).
§§ 179.06(1); 179.11(2), (10) ; 179.12(2), (7).
§8(d).
§ 8(d).

38. § 179.06(1).

39. § 203 (b) (d).
40. §§ 179.06 (1) ; 204(a) (3).

40. § 179.06(1) ; § 204(a) (3).

41. The legal implications of the word "duty" have not been determined.
For a discussion of such implications see pp. 749-750 infra.
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C. Public Interest Disputes
The provisions of the Minnesota Act with respect to the establishment of Fact-Finding Commissions were intended to accomplish the same purpose that the provisions of the Federal Act 4 2 attempted to accomplish with respect to national emergency disputes.
There are, however, several significant differences.
1. Scope
The Minnesota Act provides that a dispute "affected with a
public interest" is present when a temporary suspension of operation would endanger the life, safety, health or well-being "of a substantial number of people in any community." 43 At various times
since the enactment of the law, this section of the Act has been both
restrictively and liberally applied. 44 At the present time the Conciliator is applying a strict rule and refuses to recommend that a
commission be appointed, except where a public utility is involved,
where an entire community is dependent on one industry for its
livelihood, or where both parties feel that a Fact-Finding Commission would substantially contribute to the solving of their problems.
No Fact-Finding Commissions were appointed in 1953.
Under the Federal Act a Board of Inquiry may be appointed
by the President to inquire into a dispute when "a threatened or
actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or a substantial
part thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign
nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, will,
if permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or
'4

safety."

5

The scope of the Federal Act, being restricted to disputes which
affect national health or safety, is infinitely narrower than that of
the State Act.
2. Differences in Time Limits.
There is a significant difference between the time limits imposed
by the Minnesota Act and the Public Emergency Sections of the
Federal Act. The total waiting period under the Minnesota Act
is 50 days.40
42. §§ 206-210.

43. § 179.07; Annual Reports, Minn. Div. of Conciliation, 1939-1952. See
also Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 236 (1940).
44. See pp. 772-773 infra.
45. § 206.
46. The 20 day wait imposed by § 179.06, plus the 30 day wait under §
179.07.
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In addition to the 60-day notice required by the Federal Act,
there may be imposed, if an injunction is issued, an additional
80-day wait.47
3. Differences in Fwnctions and Procedures.
Under the Minnesota Act the Fact Finding Commission appointed by the Governor makes a report on the merits of the respective contentions of the parties. 48 Under the Federal Act, the
Board of Inquiry can only find facts and is specifically prohibited
from making recommendations.49
A strike in violation of the public interest section of the Minnesota Act constitutes an unlawful act as well as an unfair labor practice.5 0 Under the specific terms of the Act, the district courts are
empowered to restrain such conduct on the request of an individual. 51 Under the terms of the Federal Act, a strike or lockout
is not an unlawful act, and the President is the only person who is
an injunction to prevent the strike or lockout
permitted to obtain
52
from taking place.
A difference in the approach of the acts becomes apparent when
it is observed that the Federal Act specifically provides that where
an injunction is issued it shall be the duty of the parties to make
every effort to adjust and settle their differences, with the assistance of the Federal Conciliator. However, neither party is under a
duty to accept, in whole or in part, any proposal of settlement made
by the Conciliator 5 3
D. Employees Rights of Self-Organization
The language used in the Federal and Minnesota Acts with respect to the employees' rights of self-organization differs in one
material respect. Section 179.10 of the Minnesota Act is substantially the same as Section 7 of the Federal Act, except that it states
employees may engage in "lawful" concerted activities. The addition of the word "lawful" in the Minnesota Act is significant, since
Minnesota makes some acts unlawful which the Federal Act does
47. § 209(b). This is made up of the 60 days which the Board of Inquiry
has to maKe atb report to the President, the 15 days which the N. L. R. B.
then has to conduct a vote on the employer's last offer, and the 5 days which
the Board has to certify the results of the vote.

48. § 179.07.
49. § 206.

50. §§ 179.11(2), (10) ; 179.12(2), (7).

51. § 179.14.

52. § 208(a).
53. § 209(a).
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not. Therefore, those acts which are unlawful are not protected
under the Minnesota Act. 4
Despite the fact that the word "lawful" is omitted from the
Federal Act, the courts have held that certain types of conduct are
not protected.55 The Minnesota Courts have likewise held that certain types of conduct prohibited at common law are not protected
activity within the meaning of Section 179.10.6
E. Representation and Certification
1. CertificationProcedures.
Under the Federal Act a secret ballot must be taken to determine the question of representation.57 Under the Minnesota Act,
the State Conciliator has the right to use alternative methods such
as a verification of authorization cards or the individual interview
of employees.5 8
Under the Federal Act an existing contract constitutes a bar to
an election during the term of the contract."5 Under the State Act
an existing contract does not constitute a bar to an election.65
Under the Federal Act supervisory employees and union organizers who are not employees are usually not permitted to act as
observers at an election. They are so permitted under the State Act.
Under the Federal Act a petitioning union must usually show
that it represents 30 percent of the employees in an appropriate
unit."' As a matter of practice the State Labor Conciliator generally
requires the same showing.
54. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236

Minn. 303, 306, 53 N. W. 2d 36, 39 (1952):

"It is apparent that the two statutes are identical in meaning and almost
identical in wording, except for the italicized word 'lawful' which is
found in the state statute and not found in the federal statute. The words

'concerted activities' used in both statutes include strike action. When

the state statute used the words 'lawful, concerted activities' it must
refer to lawful concerted action under Minnesota Statutes."
55. NLRB v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939) ; Allen
Bradley Local 1171 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S.
740 (1942).
56. State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N. W. 903 (1939).
57. § 9(c) (1).
58. § 179.16(2), Warehouse Employees Union v. Forman Ford & Co.,
220 Minn. 34, 18 N. W. 2d 767 (1945) ; State ex rel. American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Hanson, 229 Minn. 341, 38 N. W.
2d 845 (1949).
59. Ford Motor Co., 95 N. L. R. B. 932 (1951).
60. J. F. Quest Foundry Co. v. International Molders and Foundry
Workers Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N. W. 2d 32 (1944). But whether it is a
bar to certification has not yet been determined.
61. 22 L. R. R. M. 34 (1948), 21 L. R. R. M. 55 (1947). The 30 per
cent showing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. NLRB v. White Construc-
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Under the Federal Act, an election may not be required within
one year from the holding of a valid election. 62 Under the State Act
an election may be held within a year unless the first election resulted in a certification.6 3
The decisions of the NLRB are published, thus providing a permanent record and establishing a body of precedent. The decisions
of the State Conciliator are not published, thus permitting the exercise of much wider discretion by him.6 4
Under the Federal Act, if the number of challenged ballots is
sufficient to affect the results of an election the challenged ballots
are opened and counted. Under the State Act, a new election is
ordered.
The Minnesota Act65 provides that the Conciliator shall not
certify any union which is dominated, controlled, or maintained by
an employer. A similar policy is evidenced in Section 8(a) (2) of
the Federal Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice to dominate
or interfere with a labor organization or to contribute financial or
other support to it. There is nothing in Section 9, the certification
section of the Federal Act, comparable to the Minnesota provision;
but.the Federal Act has been construed to prevent certification of
employer dominated unions. 66 The reasoning behind such a refusal
to certify is that such unions are "patently incapable of bargaining
at arm's length.

'67

The Federal Act is more restrictive than the Minnesota Act
in that it provides that employees on strike who are not entitled to
re-instatement shall not be eligible to vote in representation election Co., 204 F. 2d 950, 32 L. R. R. M. 2198 (5th Cir. 1953).

Where an employer has previously been found to have engaged in and

failed to remedy unfair labor practices, a smaller showing of representation

interest than is ordinarily required will be accepted.
Thompson Products, Inc., 63 N. L. R. B. 1495, 17 L. R. R. M. 82 (1945)
(19% accepted).
Denbach Shipbuilding Corp., 67 N. L. R. B. 237, 17 L. R. R. If.447
(1946) (26.6% accepted).
62. § 9(c) (3).
63. § 179.16(2).
64. As to the wide discretion given to the Conciliator in selecting a bargaining agent, see State ex rel. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees v. Hanson, 229 Minn. 341, 38 N. W. 2d 845 (1949);
Warehouse Employees Union v. Forman Ford & Co., 220 Minn. 34, 18 N. W.
2d 767 (1945) ; In re Amalgamated Food Handlers, Local 653 and Egekvist
Bakeries, Inc., and Retail Clerks Union, Local 1086, 2d Dist. Minn., Feb. 9,
1954.
65. § 179.16(2).
66. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 63 N. L. R. B. 990, 17 L. R. R. M. 43
(1945) ; Kansas City Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 111 F. 2d 340, 6 L. R.
R. M%.
938 (8th Cir. 1940).
67. Phelps Dodge Corp., 6 N. L. R. B. 624, 2 L. R. R. Mf. 191 (1938).
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tions. 5 The Minnesota Act contains no such restriction. A worker
continues to be an "employee" within the Act even though he has
ceased work because of any current labor dispute, except where he
has obtained other regular and substantially equivalent employment.69 Thus, the Minnesota Act is the same as the Federal Act
was before the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947.
Both the Federal Act and the State Act give the power to the
administrators of the acts to subpoena witnesses 70 and grant jurisdiction to district courts to hold in contempt of court one who fails
to appear to testify and produce evidence. 7 L But the Federal Act
goes further in that it eliminates the privilege against self-incrimi72
nation as a defense to the production of evidence or testimony,
allows witnesses the same fees as witnesses in court, 73 and provides
for fine or imprisonment or both if one wilfully interferes with the
74
performance of duties by the Board or its agents.
2. The Appropriate Unit
There are a number of significant distinctions between the
Federal and State Acts as to what constitutes the appropriate unit:
a. Craft Units.
Under the Minnesota Act 75 if a craft unit exists it shall constitute the appropriate unit.
7
Under the Federal Act 6 it may constitute the appropriate unit. 7
The Minnesota Act is thus more favorable to the establishment
of craft units than is the Federal Act.
68. § 9(c) (3).
69. § 179.01(4).
70. § 179.16(3) ; § 11(1).
71. § 179.16(4) ;§11 (2).
72. § 11(3).
73. § 11 (4).
74. § 12.
75. § 179.16(2).
76. § 9(b) (2).
77. Prior to the N. L. R. B.'s recent decision in American Potash &
Chemical Corp., 33 L. R. R. M. 1380 (1954), § 9(b) (2) was construed so that
craft units would not be severed in industries involving highly integrated
processes and in which the prevailing pattern of bargaining was industrial
in character. See National Tube Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 1199, 21 L. R. R. M. 1292
(1948). The Potash decision states that this practice wvill not be extended
to industries other than basic steel, aluminum, lumber and wet milling. It
further states that where a true craft group is seeking severance and the
union seeking to represent it is one which traditionally represents that craft,
or where a departmental group is functionally distinct and separate and
where the union seeking to represent it has traditionally devoted itself to
serving the special interest of the employees in question, severance will be
permitted.
Section 9(b) (2) of the Federal Act provides that prior determination
of a unit by the N. L. R. B. is not to stand in the way of the existence
of a craft unit unless a majority of the employees vote against the establishment of the craft unit.
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b. One Man Units.
The Minnesota Act specifically permits one person to constitute
an appropriate unit.78 The National Labor Relations Board has
7
ruled that one man units are not appropriate. 9
c. The Extent of Organizationas a Factorin Determining the
Appropriate Unit.
The Federal Act expressly states that the extent of organization shall not be controlling." The Minnesota Act contains no such
prohibition. In fact, the extent of organization has been considered
to be an important factor in many representation cases.
d. Industry Wide Units.
The Minnesota Act specifically permits industry-wide bargaining units if all of the employers involved consent."'
The Federal Act contains nothing specific as to the rights of
employers to bargain together. However, the legislative history
states that an employer association may fall within the definition
of employer in Section 2 (2) when it is "acting as an agent of the
employer." 8 2 There is no requirement in the Federal Act that each
employer consent to the industry wide unit. 3 The National Labor
Relations Board has authorized employers' associations to engage
in industry-wide bargaining. 4
Employers' Associations have also been found guilty of committing unfair labor practices.

85

e. ProfessionalEmployees.
The Federal Act" excludes professional employees8 7 from being in the same unit with non-professionals, unless a majority of
the professionals vote for inclusion. The Minnesota Act contains no
such limitation on the inclusion of professional employees.
78. § 179.16(2).
79. Laclede-Christy Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 53, 30 L. R. R. M. 1079 (1952).
80. § 9(c) (5).
81. § 179.16(2). This section must be considered in conjunction with
§ 179.10(2), which specifically grants employers the right to associate together for bargaining.
82. H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1947). This, the report states, is merely a re-affirmation of the practice of the NLRB
already existing under the Wagner Act.

83. But see, Continental Baking Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 777, 30 L. R. R. M.
1119 (1952).
84. Matter of Rayonier, Inc., 52 N. L. R. B. 1269 (1943) ; California
Metal Trades Association, 72 N. L. R. B. 624 (1947) ; Denver Heating, Piping
Contractors, 99 N. L. . B. 251, 30 L. R. R. M. 1061 (1952); Bryant's
Marina, Inc., 92 N. L. . B. 718, 27 L. R. R. M. 1161 (1950).
85. Holme & Seifert, 102 N. L. R.B. 347, 31 L. R. R. M. 1313 (1953).
86. § 9(b) (1).
87. § 2(12).
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f. Plant Guards.
The Federal Act provides that "guards" cannot be included
within the same unit as other employees. It furthermore provides
that if the guards seek to" be represented, they can be represented
only by a union which neither admits other employees nor is affiliated in any manner with an organization that does. 8 The Minnesota Act contains no prohibition against plant guards being members of a union which admits other employees.
F. Duty to Bargainin Good Faith
The Minnesota Act does not specify what constitutes bargaining
in good faith. The Federal Act8 9 specifically provides that bargaining in good faith requires:
(1) That the parties meet at reasonable times.
(2) That they confer in good faith.
(3) That they incorporate in a written contract any agreement
which is actually reached if requested by either party, providing
that such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
(4) That the parties give 60 day notice of modification or termination of a contract.
Under the Federal Act the failure to bargain in good faith constitutes an unfair labor practice.9 0 The Minnesota Act does not
make such a failure either an unfair labor practice or unlawful,
but it does raise the "duty" to so bargain. 91 The question therefore
arises as to whether the effect of the creation of the duty in Minnesota is mandatory and therefore enforceable or merely directory.
Logical arguments can be made on both sides. The duty can be
termed enforceable by drawing an analogy to proceedings under
the Railway Labor Act.9 2 Here, the U. S. Supreme Court has stated
that when an express legal duty has been created, it is enforceable
by resort to the usual judicial remedies of injunction. 93 The court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to create a duty
without intending that the duty be enforced. The absence of a
specific penalty is not controlling. Many rights are enforced for
which no statutory penalties are provided. The United States
88. § 9(b)(3).
89. § 8(d).
90. Ibid.
91. Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum Layers Union, 229 Minn. 87, 39
N. W. 2d 183 (1949).
92. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U. S. C. 151 et seq. (Supp.
1952).
93. Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
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Supreme Court has also seen fit to hold enforceable by injunction
and suit for damages an implied duty arising out of the Railway
Labor Act.94
It can also be argued that the duty imposed by the Minnesota
Act is not an enforceable one.95 This conclusion can be sustained
by reasoning that since failure to comply with the notice provisions
of 179.06 is specifically made both an unfair labor practice and an
unlawful act, the failure to specifically so provide as to bargaining
in good faith evidences a legislative intent not to enforce the duty.
G. Adjustment of Grievancesby Employees
Under the Minnesota Act an individual employee has a right
to adjust his own grievances. 96 He also has the right to have the
grievances adjusted by a representative of his own choosing, which
could be construed so as to authorize the presentation of the grievance through a rival union when there exists a ecrtified bargaining
representative for the unity7 Under the Federal Act, 8 an individual employee may also adjust his own grievances, 9 but there is
conflict as to whether a rival union can present the grievance for
him.100 Under the Federal Act the representative of the employees
94. Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U. S. 192
(1944).
95. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 236 (1940).
96. § 179.16(1).
97. The language of this section of the Minnesota Act differs from that
of § 9(a) of the federal Act. Subdivision (1) of § 179.16 contains the proviso
.provided, that any individual employee or group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer in person or
through representatives of their own choosing." [Emphasis added.] The
phrase "or through representatives of their own choosing" was contained in
the original House and Senate bills relating to the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935. The.phrase was eliminated in order to avoid the implication that
the "individual" or "group" might select any representative it wished, such as
the business agent of a rival union. See Federated Telephone & Radio Co., 107
N. L. R. B. No. 146, 33 L. R. R. M. 1203 (1953) ; Hearings, House Committee on Labor on H. R. 6288, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 301 (1935) ; H. Rep.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1935) ; compare S.2926 (73d Cong.),
with S.1958 (7th Cong.), Senate Committee Print, p. 3 (March 11, 1935).
The use of the phrase in the Railway Labor Act had been interpreted as
meaning that a rival union could represent employees in a grievance session.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U. S.711, 722, 737, 16 L. R. R. M.
749 (1944). See also 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 494 (1949).
98. § 9(a).
99. An inexperienced employee may have a more experienced friend
aid him in presenting the grievance. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F. 2d
69 (5th Cir. 1945). The employee may be denied permission to have private
counsel at the hearing. NLRB Gen. Coun. Adm. Rul. Case No. 334, 30
L. R. R. M. 1303 (June 27, 1952).
100. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Douds v. Retail
Store Union, 173 F. 2d 764 (2d Cir.), 23 L. R. R. M. 2424 (1949), held that
a rival union may represent the employee. This decision has been widely
criticized. See Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 Pitt. L. Rev. 35, 38, 55 (1949) ; Dunou, Employee Participation
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within the unit to which the employee belongs has a right to be
present during the adjustment of the grievance, even though he is
not permitted to interfere.
The Federal Act specifically provides that an individual employee is not permitted to adjust grievances in such a way that it
would conflict with the terms of the contract between the employer
and the union.101 And such provision is contained in the Minnesota Act, but it would be highly illogical if this were not read into
the Act.
H. Employee Unfair LaborPractices
The Minnesota Act and the Federal Act differ in several important respects as to employee unfair labor practices.
(1) A breach of a collective bargaining agreement by either
employees or employer constitutes an unfair labor practice under
the State Act' 0 2 but not under the Federal Act.
(2) The Minnesota Act makes a strike or lockout in breach of
a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice.1 03 The
Federal Act 0 4 provides that a strike or lockout before the expiration of the 60 days notice of intent to change or modify the contract or the expiration date of the contract, whichever is later, is a
refusal to bargain in good faith and therefore an unfair labor
practice.' 05
(3) The Federal Act has no provisions in it which are comparable to Section 179.11 (3-6, and 9) of the State Act:
"(3) For any person to seize or occupy property unlawfully
during the existence of a labor dispute;
"(4) For any person to picket or cause to be picketed a place
of employment of which place the person is not an employee
while a strike is in progress affecting the place of employment,
unless the majority of persons engaged in picketing the place
of employment at these times are employees of the place of
employment;
"(5) For more than one person to picket or cause to be picketed
a single entrance to any place of employment where no strike
is in progress at the time;
in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining,50 Col. L. Rev. 73 (1950)

Comment, 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1950) ; Note, 34 Cornell L. Q. 655
(1949) ; Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1949). The NLRB has expressly rejected the view of the Second Circuit and refuses to allow a rival union to
present a grievance. Federal Telephone & Radio Co., 107 N. L. R. B. No.
146, 33 L. R. R. M. 1203 (1953).
101. § 9(a).
102. § 179.11(1).

103. Ibid.
104. § 8(d) (1).
105. See note 30 supra.
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"(6) For any person to interfere in any manner with the operation of a vehicle or the operator thereof when neither the owner
nor operator of the vehicle is at the time a party to a strike;
"(9) Provides in substance that it is an unfair labor practice to
hinder or prevent by intimidation, force, coercion or sabotage
the production ... by a producer . . . of agricultural products
or to combine.., to cause loss or injury to any producer ... "
Under holdings of the NLRB and the United States Supreme
Court, however, much of the activity prohibited by sub-division 3
08
has been held not protected by the Federal Act.Y
(4) The Federal Act contains no specific provision similar to
Section 179.13, which prohibits the interference with the use of
public streets, roads and highways, or methods of transportation
or conveyance, or the wrongful obstruction of ingress to or egress
from any place of business or employment. However, to the extent
that this section may be held to prohibit mass picketing, the Federal
Act has been held to prohibit the same conduct 07
(5) The Minnesota Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for any person or labor organization to take part in a strike
unless it had been approved by a majority vote of the employees.
There is no comparable provision in the Federal Act at the present
time. 08
The Minnesota Act makes it an unfair labor practice to compel or attempt to compel an employee to join a labor organization
or a strike against his will by unlawful interference with his person,
family or property 0 9
The Federal Act contains no similar provision but does contain provisions which are broader than the Minnesota Act. The
Minnesota Act appears to prohibit only threats of physical violence,
while the Federal Act prohibits all forms of restraint or coercion.,,"
The Federal Act also prohibits a union from charging discriminatory or excessive fees.:""
(6) The two most important respects in which the employee
106. NLRB v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corp, 306 U. S. 240 (1939), 23
Minn. L. Rev. 700; Mid Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 912, 13
L. R. R. M. 228 (1944). Such activity is also prohibited by Minn. Stat. § 601.57

(1949).

107. Sunset Line and Twine Co., 79 N. L. R. B. 1487, 23 L. R. R. M.

1001 (1948).

108. § 179.11(8). See Note, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 64, 66 (1944) for an
analysis of this provision. President Eisenhower has proposed that a similar
provision be incorporated in the Federal Act. January 11, 1954, H. R. Doc.
No. 291, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).

109. § 179.11(7).
110. §§8(b)(1);8(b)(5).
111.

§ 8(b) (5).
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unfair labor practices section of the Minnesota Act are more restrictive than the Federal Act are:
(a) Each of the unfair labor practices on the part of employees
with the exception of instituting a strike in violation of a collective
bargaining agreement is also an unlawful act and thus a misdemeanor" 2 under the Minnesota Act.
(b) The Minnesota Act with respect to unfair labor practices
on the part of employees is directed toward individuals as well as
the labor organizations. This is true even though the individual
may not have been acting as an agent of the labor organization.
The Federal Act is directed only toward acts committed by a labor
organization or its agents. It does not regulate the conduct of individuals acting in a private capacity. In this connection it should
also be noted that the Minnesota Act, Section 179.11 in Subdivisions 3, 4, 5 and 6 does not make any mention of labor organizations. This may indicate that the legislature intended that only the
individuals who personally participate in these activities may be
guilty of unfair labor practices or unlawful acts, and that the unions
to which they belong cannot be held responsible for violation of
these subdivisions.
I. Employer UnfairLabor Practices
The Minnesota Act, with respect to unfair labor practices on
the part of employers is less stringent than the Federal Act in two
important particulars.
1. It contains nothing comparable to Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Federal Act which prohibits interference, restraint, or coercion of
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7;
2. It contains nothing comparable to Section 8 (a) (2) which
prohibits domination or interference with the formation or administration of any labor organization or the contribution of financial or other support to it, though it does forbid the certification of
such a labor organization." 3
Although the Minnesota Act appears to go beyond the Federal
Act in stating that spying and blacklisting are unfair labor practices, both practices have been held to be violative of Section 8
x4
(a) (1) of the Federal Act."
112. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 233 (1940). A survey of attorneys

actively engaged in the practice of labor law indicates that no criminal pro-

ceedings have been initiated under the Act.
113. § 179.16(2).
114. NLRB v. Public Service Co-ordinated Transport, 177 F. 2d 125,

24 L. R. R. M. 2466 (3d Cir. 1949) (spying); Russell Manufacturing Co.,
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The Minnesota Act 1 5 and the Federal Act"" are substantially
the same with respect to employer discrimination against employees
because of membership in a labor organization." 7 They are also
similar. with respect to discrimination against or discharge of an
employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the
Acts."

J. Suits by and Against Personsor Organizationsas a Result
of the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices.
1. Service of Process.
The Federal Act and the Minnesota Act differ on upon whom
process may be served. The Federal Act provides that service of
process on a union may be made only by serving an officer or agent
of the union in his capacity as such." 9 The Minnesota Act states
that service on any individual union member constitutes proper
service on the union.'

20

The Minnesota Act' 2- provides that the doing of business within the State of Minnesota is deemed an appointment of the Secretary of State to receive process and notices dealing with any actions
under the Minnesota Act or other laws of the State of Minnesota,
where the union or employer group has officers, agents, members
or property outside Minnesota.

22

82 N. L. R. B. 1081, 23 L. R. R. M. 1669 (1949)

(blacklisting) enforced

in part, 187 F. 2d 296,relearinggranted, 187 F. 2d 336, aff'd in part, 191 F.
2d 358 (5th Cir. 1951).
Blacklisting or spying may also be factors indicating an employee was
discriminatorily discharged in violation of § 8(a) (3). Russell Mfg. Co., supra;
Williams Lumber Co., 93 N. L. R. B. 1672, 27 L.R.R.M. 1629 (1951).

115. § 179.12(3).

116. § 8(a) (3).
117. See Section on Union Security and Membership.
118. §§ 179.12(4) ; 8(a) (4). Subdivisions 1 and 2 of § 179.12 are the
same as § 179.11 (1) and (2). They have counterparts in the Federal Act and
have been discussed in the section dealing with employee unfair labor practices.
119. § 301(d).
120. § 540.151.
121. § 540.152.
122. Section 303 (b) of the Federal Act specifies that in suits for damages
under Section 303 (a) both the U. S. districts courts and any other court having jurisdiction of the parties shall have jurisdiction to hear such suits. This
section therefore allows suits in Minnesota state courts for violation of the
Federal Act. If suit is in the state court, the question then arises as to whether
the state or federal law applies as to the service of process.
The state policy governs questions of procedure. Missouri ex rel. Southem Railway Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950). (This proposition seems to
be assumed by the cases cited infra note 131 dealing with the issue of substantive law.) Therefore, service upon an individual union member pursuant
to either § 179.27 or Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(b) would be valid in a suit for
damages brought in a Minnesota state court under the Federal Act. A
major difficulty with allowing service upon individual members is that notice
may not be transmitted to proper officers thus resulting in default.

19541
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2. ProvisionsAllowing Suit.
The right to maintain a suit for damages caused by a violation
the Minnesota Act rests in the person
of one of the provisions of
12 3
who has been damaged.
Under the Federal Act the exclusive right, unless otherwise
expressly provided, to make an injured party whole rests with the
NLRB. A suit for damages may be maintained under the Federal
Act where violations of the following sections are charged:
124
301 (a) (b) Breach of contract.'
303 (a) (1) Secondary Boycott.
303 (a) (2) Strike or concerted refusal to force recognition or
bargaining where the union has not been certified.
303 (a) (3) Strike or concerted refusal to force recognition or
bargaining where another union has been certified.
303 (a) (4) Jurisdictional strikes.
The Minnesota Act allows recovery in tort if a strike, boycott,
or picketing has occurred where another union has been certified
by state or federal authorities if the purpose of such action is:
(1) To deny the right of the certified union to act as representative;
(2) To prevent it from acting as authorized by the certification; or
(3) To interfere with the business of the employer in an effort
25
to do either of the above mentioned acts.1
While the Federal Act 126 specifically allows damage suits for

breach of contract, the Minnesota Act is silent on this point. However, it seems safe to conclude that such suits in Minnesota would
be allowed under the common law right to sue for breach of
contract.
123. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 235 (1940) suggests that since violation of either §§ 179.11(7) or 179.12(8) is likely to be treated as a misde-

meanor and in view of the fact that §§ 179.11 and 179.12 were enacted for

the benefit of the employer-farmer group and the employee-labor group respectively, the violation of §§ 179.11 (7) or 179.12(8) will subject the violator

to civil liability for damages caused thereby.
124. A recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit construing § 301 has held, four to three, that a refusal by the employer to pay wages allegedly due to employees is not a violation of the collective bargaining contract so as to bring it within § 301 (a) and federal juris-

diction, but that the duty to pay wages arises instead out of the individual con-

tract for hire. Ass'n of Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 33 L. R. R. M. 2462
(1954). There seems to be some conflict on this question. For a contra view,
,ee AF of L v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 179 F. 2d 535, 25 L. R. R. Ml.
2327 (6th Cir. 1950).

125. §§ 179.27, 179.28.
126. § 301.
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3. Those Subject to Suit-Collectabilityof Judgments.
The Federal Act" 7 provides for actions against unions, but only
against them as entities and not against the individual members of
the unions as such. In such suits the judgments are collectible from
and enforceable against only the union and its assets and not the
individual members or their assets. These limitations of Section
301 also apply to suits under Section 303.
The Minnesota Act not only provides that individuals may
commit unfair labor practices,: 2 but it also provides that a judgment shall "accrue to the joint or common benefit of and bind the
the same as though
joint or common property of the associates,
' 29
all had been named party to the action.'
This may mean that in theory, an employer can sue and collect
from the employees involved as individuals or as joint tort feasors
with the union or representative of employees. 130 If the union alone
were sued, it would seem that recovery would be limited to the
union's assets.13"
4. Liabilityfor Acts of Agents.
While there is nothing specific in the Minnesota Act as to the
liability of the union for the acts of its agents, it seems safe to assume that the common law rules of agency would apply.
The Federal Act' 2 states that a union or employer is bound
by the acts of its agents and that a union may sue or be sued on
behalf of the employees it represents.
Section 301 (b) is qualified by Sections 301 (e) and 2(13) which
state that actual authorization or subsequent ratification shall not
be controlling in imputing the liability of the agent to the union or
employer. The legislative history shows that the intent of this pro127. § 301(b).
128. §§ 179.11(1-9), 179.13, 179.42.
129. §§ 540.151, 179,28.
130. § 540.151.
131. Questions arise as to whether, in a suit for damages brought in a
state court pursuant to § 303(b) arising out of a violation of the Federal
Act, recourse may be had to the personal assets of an individual employee, or
whether money judgments are enforceable only against the union as an
entity and its assets, as under the Federal Act. Both of these are questions of
substantive law. They may be answered by drawing an analogy to cases under
the FELA, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. 51 et seq. (Supp.
1952), since under FELA, as under the Federal Act, a federal right of
action is created allowing suits in the state courts.
Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452 (1947) and Propper
v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 237 Minn. 386, 54 N. W. 2d 840 (1952), hold
that where a federal right of action is created the federal substantive law
governs. Therefore, in suits in Minnesota state courts arising under the
Federal Act, only the union can be sued and money judgments resulting are
enforceable only against the union and its assets.

132. § 301(b).
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vision was to avoid the construction which was placed on Section
6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by the Supreme Court in United
Brotherhood of Carpentersand Joiners v. United States 33 which
in effect required proof of actual instigation, participation or ratification before a union (or employer association) could be held
responsible. The intent of Sections 301 and 2(13) therefore was to
134
restore the common law rules of agency to this area.
K. Injunctionsand TemporaryRestrainingOrders
Probably the most significant differences between the Minnesota Act and the Federal Act are those directly related to the procedures in the acts to prevent unfair labor practices.
1. Under the Minnesota Act, either an employer or a union
may obtain an injunction where an unfair labor practice is threatened or committed. 135
Under the Federal Act, only the NLRB has power to apply for
an injunction. 13
2. Under the Minnesota Act ex parte restraining orders are obtainable.

37

Under the Federal Act, before an injunction can be

obtained by the Board, a preliminary investigation must be made
by the Board. Since Minnesota procedure allows ex parte orders
to be obtained from the courts while the Federal Act requires recourse to the NLRB and its administrative procedures before the
Board 138 seeks any relief, it is apparent that the remedy under the
Minnesota Act is speedier. This difference in the length of time in
which relief is obtainable is recognized by the Supreme Court in
the Garner case, 39 but the court holds that where the acts complained of fall within federal jurisdiction, recourse to injunctive
relief in the state courts is forbidden.
The right to injunctive relief under the State Act is limited by
two restrictions. 40
1. Employers, individuals or unions violating "any" of the
provisions of the Act lose the right to injunctive relief.
2. Neither employers, individuals, nor unions have the right to
133. 330 U. S. 395 (1947).
134. 93 Cong. Rec. 6858-6859 (1947); Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79
N. L. R. B. 1487,23 L. R. R. M. 1001 (1948).

135. § 179.14.
136. § 310(j). Where a violation of § 8(b) (4) (A), (B) or (C) is

charged, the Board must seek an injunction. § 10(1). This requirement would

be eliminated if the President's proposal adopted by the Senate Labor Committee becomes law. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 426 (1954).
137. § 179.14.
138. § 310(1).
139. 346 U. S. 485, 33 L. R. R. M. 2218 (1953).

140. § 179.15.
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maintain an action for injunctive relief until they have in good faith
utilized all means available under Minnesota laws to settle the
141.
dispute.
There is no specific counterpart in the Federal Act to these
Minnesota provisions. However, the NLRB has at times enforced
a clean hands requirement on both the employer and the union.,, 2
L. Jurisdicti~ww Disputes
Minnesota
Act and the Federal Act make extensive
Both the
efforts to prevent jurisdictional disputes. They differ materially,
however, not only in what they consider to be a jurisdictional dispute but also with respect to the type of action which can be taken
with regard to the dispute.
The major differences between the State and Federal Acts are:
1. Under the Minnesota Act economic action does not become
unlawful until the Governor has appointed a referee or until the
dispute has been submitted to another tribunal. 14 3 Under the Federal Act the economic action constitutes an unfair labor practice and
4

and an unlawful act from its inception.1

4

2. The Minnesota Act restricts all picketing even though it
141. It has been suggested, Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217 (1940), that
these provisions seek to instill into the Miinnesota Act the equitable principle
of clean hands.
The Note reasons that one of the principle benefits conferred by the Act,
which a failure to conform to § 179.15 would possibly eliminate, is the right
to sue in tort for damages for acts in violation of §§ 179.11, .12, .13 and .083,
since the designations of certain acts as unlawful creates the possibility of civil

liability for the violation of a criminal statute. However, the fact that the

person against whom it is committed is guilty of unclean hands would not

make the act committed any less unlawful.
Another principle benefit conferred by the Act is the right to receive
the notice provided for in §§ 179.06 and .07. It can be argued that one guilty
of unclean hands would lose the right to receive these notices.

142. The refusal by a union to bargain in good faith (that is, it's lack
of clean hands) may preclude a finding by the Board of the failure of the employer to bargain in good faith. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 101
N. L. R. B. 360, 31 L. R. R. M. 1072 (1952); Times Publishing Co., 72
N. L. R. B. 676, 19 L. R. R. M. 1199 (1947).
Misconduct of a party, such as the dynamiting of an employer's property,
may be considered as material by the Board in deciding whether to entertain
and proceed upon a charge; though such misconduct, dubious character, evil
or unlawful notices, or bad faith would not deprive the Board of jurisdiction
to hear the case. The Board is not required to move on every charge, it is
merely enabled to do so, and it may decline to be imposed upon where its
process is submitted to abuse. NLRB v. Indiana and Michigan Electric Co.
317 U. S. 9, 11 L. R. R. M. 763 (1943) ; Gaynor News Co., 93 N. L. R. B.
299, 27 L. R. R. M. 1387 (1951).
However, misconduct of a union involving violations of general civil
or commercial precepts, such as breaches of the peace, cannot deprive the union
or employees of their rights under § 9(c) of the Federal Act. LaFollette
Shirt Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 952, 17 L. R. R. M. 248 (1946).

143. § 179.083.

144.

§§8(b) (4) (D),303(a) (4).
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does not induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in a strike or concerted refusal. Thus, picketing directed at
influencing non-employees would be unlawful under the State Act,
145
but has been held permissible under the Federal Act.
3. The Minnesota Act applies to individuals; the Federal Act
only applies to a labor organization or its agents.
4. Under the Minnesota Act,'14 6 an aggrieved employer may ob1
tain injunctive relief in a state court while under the Federal Act,:4

injunctive relief can only be obtained by the NLRB.
5. Under the Minnesota Act, a violation may be a criminal
48
offense, while under Federal Act, it is not.1
6. Both the Minnesota Act and the Federal Act provide a means
of settling the dispute between the parties. 49 If, however, the parties
145. Samuel Langer, 82 N. L. R. B. 1028, 23 L. R. R. M. 1661 (1949);
Santa Ana Lumber Co., 87 N. L. R. B. 937,25 L. R. R. M. 1229 (1949) ; Sheet
Metal Workers A. F. L., 102 N. L. R. B. 166, 31 L. R. R. M. 1479 (1953) ;
General Counsel Adm. Ruling Case No. 305, 30 L. R. R. M. 1034 (May 14,
1952).146. §179.14.

147. § 10(j).

148. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 233 (1940).
149. The Federal Act differs in that the proceedings are initiated by an
unfair labor practice charge and under § 10(k) are determined by the
N. L. R. B., unless within 10 days after notice of the filing of the charge,
the parties show that they have adjusted the dispute or agreed upon
methods for its voluntary adjustment.
The purpose of § 10(k) is to provide the parties with an opportunity to
settle jurisdictional disputes among themselves without government intervention whenever possible. 93 Cong. Rec. 4155 (1947). Various means have
been undertaken to achieve this goal:
(1) International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,
Blacksmiths and Forgers Helpers jurisdictional pact with Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers AFL, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 235 (1954).
(2) Plan for Arbitration of Intra-AFL Disputes, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep.
2882 (1954).
(3) International Association of Machinists and Independent Printing
Pressmen procedure for adjusting jurisdictional disputes, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep.
127 (1953).
(4) AFL-CIO no raiding pact, 31 L. R. R. M. 100 (1953).
(5) Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL, ban on all
picketing in jurisdictional disputes by the 19 unions affiliated with the department, 30 L. R. R. M. 65 (1952).
(6) CIO Jurisdictional Disputes Plan, 31 L. R. R. M. 106 (1953), 28
L. R. R. M. 62 (1951).
(7) United Automobile Workers CIO and International Association of
Machinists AFL, no raiding pact, 25 L. R. R. M. 44 (1950).
(8) National Joint Board set up by the Association of Building Contractors and the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL
for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes by arbitration, 21 L. R. M. M. 16
(1948).
(9) Metal Trades Department, AFL, plan for arbitration to prevent
jurisdictional strikes-18 L. R. R. M. 68 (1946). An agreement by unions to
be bound by the determination of a third party, such agreement being entered
into before the dispute arose, precludes the NLRB's jurisdiction over the
matter. Carpenters AFL, 96 N. L. R. B. 1045, 29 L. R. R. M. 1002 (1951).
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do not agree to submit the dispute to their own tribunal, there is
a substantial difference in practical results, as the NLRB uniformly holds in favor of the union to whom the employer has made the
work assignment. 50
M. Interferencewith Certification and Collective
BargainingAgreements.
The Minnesota Act' 51 provides:
"It is unlawful for any employee, a representative of employees
or a union to conduct a strike or boycott against an employer
or to picket the employer's place of business in order to (1) deny
the right of representation certified by State or Federal authority to act as such representative; or (2) prevent such certified representatives from acting as such; or (3) interfere with
the business of the employer in an effort to do either (1) or
(2). A cause of action for money damages is granted to an
aggrieved employer."
The Federal Act 5 2 provides:
"It is an unfair labor practice to strike or induce the employees
of any employer to strike or withhold their services where an
object is to compel any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular union as representative of his employees if another
union has been certified by the NLRB as representative. Section 303 of the LMRA permits an action for money damages."
The basic difference pointed out in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 with
reference to jurisdictional disputes are applicable to these sections
as well.
In addition to the general differences, the Minnesota Act is
substantially broader than the Federal Act in that it prohibits
picketing and boycotts as well as a strike or the inducement of a
strike.
The Federal Act contains no provisions similar to Section
179.135 of the Minnesota Act which prohibits an officer, business
agent, or representative of a union from requiring an employer to
negotiate when the employer is already under contract to another
union. No cases have arisen under this section of the Minnesota
Act.
It is not clear, however, whether a union which was damaged as
150. Carpenter's Union, AFL (Ora Collard), 98 N. L. R. B. 346, 29
L. R. R. M. 1333 (1952), Juneau Spruce Corp. 82 N. L. R. B. 650 (1940),
holding that an employer may make work assignments free of strike pressure
by a union, unless he is failing to conform to an order or certification of the
NLRB determining the bargaining agent for the employees performing
such work.
151. § 179.27.
152. § 8(b) (4) (C).
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a result of this action would be entitled to sue for damages under
the State Act, as the right to sue for damages is given expressly
to the employer without reference to the aggrieved union.' 5 3
Under the Federal Act, however, any aggrieved person can
1 4
maintain an action for damages. 5
N. Secondary Boycotts.

The basic differences between the Minnesota Act and the Federal Act with respect to secondary boycotts are:
1. A violation of the Minnesota Act is:
(a) An illegal combination in restraint of trade. 55
(b) A violation of public policy.'56
(c) An unfair labor practice.'
(d) An unlawful act." 5s
Under the Federal Act a violation is an unfair labor practice" 5
and an unlawful act, but inasmuch as there is no Federal Statute
making an unlawful act a crime the connotation is not the same.' "
2. Under the Minnesota Act, individual members of a union
who are not officers or agents of a union can violate the act.' 6'
Under the Federal Act, only a labor organization or its agents can
violate the act. It is also probable that an employer could violate
the Minnesota Act.' 62
3. Under the Minnesota Act, injunctive relief can be obtained
by the injured party,' 63 while under the Federal Act injunctive
relief can only be obtained by the NLRB .164
In addition to the basic differences listed above, there are several substantive differences. Since it is extremely difficult to list
all of them because of the vagueness of the Minnesota Act and the
absence of reported decisions, only the more important differences
in the substantive provisions of the act will be considered.
153. § 179.28.
154. § 303(b).
155.
156.
157.
158.

§ 179.43.
Ibid.
§ 179.44.
Ibid.

159. § 8(b) (4) (A).
160. Kennelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505, 511 (1928); United
States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677 (1891).

161. § 179.42.
162. No Minnesota cases have arisen involving employees, but the
language of the Act clearly conceives such a possibility, e.g., a member of
an employer association breaks away from the association during a strike
and signs an agreement with the union. Association pressure on neutral employers to refuse to provide goods or services to the dissident member would
be a violation.
163. § 179.45.

164. § 10(e).
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1. PersonsAgainst Whom Action Is Directed.
Under the Federal Act, a labor organization or its agents must
engage in, induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in a strike or concerted refusal to violate the Act.'05
Under the State Act it is a secondary boycott to cease performing services for another employer or to cause any employer to cease
performing services for another employer.?1 6 Thus under the State
Act, pressure directed against either an employer or employees is
unfair and unlawful. But under the Federal Act, it is not a secondary boycott to induce or encourage an employer directly to
cease doing business with a third party, irrespective of the motive,
as long as his employees are not in any way induced or encouraged.
Likewise, boycotts otherwise illegal are lawful if permissible under
collective bargaining contracts.

16 7

2. Type of Action Taken or Induced.
The Federal Act specifically requires that employees of the
employer either actually engage in or be induced or encouraged to
engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or
to perform any services to violate the Act.:" 8
The Minnesota Act only mentions two specific types of conduct:
(1) The refusal to handle goods, or (2) perform services. "'
3. Objects Prohibited.
The Federal Act is directed at prohibiting action where the

object thereof is:
(a) (1) Forcing an employer or7 0self employed person to join
any labor or employer organizationY.

There is no similar provision in the Minnesota Act. The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that such picketing is per17

missibleY.

165.

§8(b) (4) (A).

166. § 179.41(b), (c).
167. NLRB v. Conway Express, 29 L. R. R. M. 2617 (1952); cf. 33
Lab. Rel. Rep. 347 (1954). For a discussion on the type of conduct still
permitted, see 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 91, 92 (1954) ; Joliet Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 202 F. 2d 606, 31 L. R. R. M. 2361 (7th Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 28 L. R. R. M. 2105 (1951).
168. § 8(b) (4) (A).
169. § 179.41(a), (b), (c).
170. § 8(b) (4) (A).
171. Coons v. journeymen Barbers, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N. W. 2d 345
(1946); cf. Chernov, The Labor Injunction in Minnesota, 24 Minn. L. Rev.
757, 793 (1940).
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(2) Forcing an employer to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
72
with any other person .
The Minnesota Act, Sections 179.41 (a) (b) and (c), prohibits
substantially the same conduct.
(b) Forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization unless such labor organization
173
has been certified.
There is no similar prohibition in the Minnesota Act. Unless
the broad language of the M11innesota Act which prohibits the refusal to handle goods or perform services for another employer
because of a labor dispute, agreement or failure of agreement could
be held to cover this type of situation.
0. Union Security and Metmbership.
7
The Minnesota Act 7 4 is more liberal than the Federal Act' 5
in that it permits the union shop, closed shop, compulsory checkoff of union dues, and the hiring hall.
Each of these, except the union shop, are prohibited under the
Federal Act. 170 The union shop is permitted under certain re77
strictions.
The primary restrictions in the Federal Act not applicable to
the Minnesota Act are that an employer cannot discriminate in
any way against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership
was not available to the employee on the same terms applicable to
other members, or membership was denied or terminated for some
172.
note(4)171(B).supra.
173. See
§ 8(b)
174. § 179.12(3) ; Minn. Rep. Atty. Gen. 93 (1940).
175. § (a) (3).
176. § 8(a) (3). § 302 (c)(4) specifically prohibits the compulsory
check-off of union dues.
177. § 8(a) (3).
The discharge of an employee after the denial of union membership to
him for any reason other than his failure to pay dues or initiation fees, even
though that reason be non-discriminatory, is an unfair labor practice on the
part of both the employer and the union. Union Starch & Refining Co. v.
NLRB, 186 F. 2d 1008, 27 L. R. R. l. 2342 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342

U. S.815 (1951).

Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union or its
agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an

employee in violation of Section 8(a) (3) ; or to itself discriminate against an
employee for any other reason than his failure to pay dues or initiation fee.
See also § 9(e) (1) and (2) which allow recission of a union shop.
Section 14(b) of the Federal Act permits states to forbid the union
shop if they so desire.
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reason other than the failure to tender the uniformly required
17 8
periodic dues or initiation fee.

The Minnesota Act does not contain any of these restrictions.
Thus, in Minnesota the discharge of an employee may be procured
for reasons other than his failure to tender dues and initiation fees,
if his membership in the union was terminated for other good
cause.
A further restriction which is not in the Minnesota Act is found
in Section 8 (b) (5) of the Federal Act. This Section prohibits
the requirement of excessive or discriminatory initiation fees where
a union shop contract is in effect.
P. MinnesotaLabor Union Democracy Act.
The Minnesota Act requires mandatory elections of union officers by secret ballot after reasonable notice to eligible voters. In
the absence of any other specification as to a majority in the union
constitution or by-laws, the candidate receiving the largest number of votes cast for that office shall be declared elected. The terms
of office are limited to four years.Y8 The officers must furnish the
members with an annual statement of receipts and disbursements.'1"
Whenever the Conciliator believes that a union has been derelict
in the performance of the duties imposed by this Act, he may
certify the matter to the Governor who may appoint a referee to
conduct a hearing.'
If the charges of non-compliance are sustained, the union is disqualified from acting as bargaining representative.8 2 The disqualification may be removed by submitting
proof of performance to the Conciliator.8 3 It is unlawful for a
disqualified labor organization to act as bargaining representa8 4

tive.1

The only sections in the Federal Act which deal with the same
problems are Sections 9 (f), (g), and (h). The Federal Act contains no provisions as to the method by which union officers are to
be elected or their terms of office. However, it does require that
the names, salaries, and manner of election of the officers be filed
with the Secretary of Labor. 85 The Federal Act also requires detailed statements of the union's organizational set-up, 1- 0 including
178. § 8(a) (3) (A), (B).
179. §§ 179.19, 179.20.

180. § 179.21.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

§§ 179.22, 179.23(1) (2).
§ 179.23(5).
§ 179.23(6).
§ 179.24. See Note, 28 Minn. L. Rev. 64, 67 (1944).
§ 9(g).
§9(f) (A).
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financial condition.18 7 The Minnesota Act contains no such requirements, except for the financial statement. The Federal Act
requires that both the locals and the internationals furnish these reports."88 The Minnesota Act is not clear as to whether it applies
only to locals exclusively doing business within the state, or also
includes locals doing business in more than one state, or international unions. A further provision which is contained in the Federal Act, but not in Minnesota, is the requirement of the filing of a
non-Communist Affidavit. 189
The penalty provided for non-compliance with the Federal Act
is less severe than that of the Minnesota Act. Under the Federal
Act, such failure to comply with Sections 9 (f) and (g) denies the
labor organization the right to invoke the processes of the NLRB as
to representative questions under Section 9 (c) or unfair labor
practice charges under Section 10 (b), but the labor organization
may continue to act as bargaining representative.
Q. Arbitration
There are no provisions in the Federal Act relating to arbitration. The Minnesota Act contains a purely voluntary provision allowing the parties to a dispute to arbitrate when the dispute is not
settled by conciliation. Upon application of either or both parties
or of any arbitration tribunal created by them, the State Labor
Conciliator may designate the tribunal as a "temporary arbitration
tribunal." Such a tribunal shall possess the power to administer
oaths and issue subpoenas. A copy of the tribunal's report is to be
filed with the Conciliator." '
R. Provisionsin FederalAct not in Minnesota Act.
The following provisions of the Federal Act have no counterpart in the Minnesota Act:
1. Section S(c), dealing with the employer's right of free
speech, provides that the expression of views, arguments or opinion
shall not constitute an unfair labor practice or evidence of an unfair labor practice unless such expression contains a threat of force
or reprisal or a promise of benefit.
2. Section 302 makes unlawful the payment by an employer or
the receipt by a representative of a labor organization of any money
187. §§9(b)
188.
9(g). (1) (2).
189. § 9(h).
190. § 179.09.
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or other thing of value, with the exception of certain payments
necessary to the conduct of business such as arbitration awards and
dues checked off.
This section also authorizes health and welfare funds and sets
up procedures relating to them."91
Willful violation of Section 302 is made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
3. Section 304 amends the Federal Corrupt Practices Act so
as to make it unlawful for a labor organization to make a political
contribution to a candidate to Federal office.
4. Section 8 (b) (6) prohibits some forms of featherbedding
and related practices. So far as it relates to featherbedding, the
19 2

section has been restrictively construed.

III. THE

EXTENT TO WHICH THE MINNESOTA ACT CAN BE
APPLIED TO INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO THE FEDERAL ACT

A. General Princples
The following general principles have been established by the

United States Supreme Court.
1. A state may not curtail the right of employees in businesses
subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB to engage in concerted
activities within the meaning of Section 7.39
2. States may not apply local laws against strikes or picketing
which duplicate the Federal Act in situations where a national
remedy is available, nor may they undertake to provide state remedies for violation of the national law pending action by the NLRB.
It is immaterial whether the state restriction be statutory or common law, or whether it purports to constitute adjudication of
1 94
private rights or to enforce public regulation.
191. Both the House Labor Committee, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 297 (1954)
and the Senate Labor Committee, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 423 (1954) have scheduled
investigations into the establishment and operation of employee welfare and
pension funds for the purpose of ascertaining the necessity for additional
legislation.
192. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U. S. 100,
31' L. R. R. M. 2422 (1953): NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 345 U. S.
117, 31 L. R. R. M. 2428 (1953).
193. Automobile Workers Unions v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 26
L. R. R. M. 2082 (1950) ; Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, 27
L. R. R. M. 2385 (1951) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 16 L. R. R. M. 734
(1944) ; Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relation Board,
338 U. S. 953,25 L. R. R. M. 2395 (1950).
194. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 33 L. R. R. M. 2218
(1953) ; Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Company, 346 U. S.
393, 33 L. R. R. M. 2394 (1954).
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3. States may not exercise concurrent jurisdiction in representation cases. 1 5
4. States retain the power to prevent violence and physical
interference with property. 1' G
5. The opinions leave some uncertainty concerning state power
to deal with strikes and picketing not forbidden by the Federal Act
but so closely related to activities dealt with in the Federal Act as
195. Bethlehem Steel Company v. New York Labor Relations Board,
33 U. S. 767, 19 L. R. R. M. 2499 (1947); LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 18, 23 L. R. R. M. 2236
(1949).
196. Allen Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 315 U. S. 740, 10 L. R. R. M. 520 (1942); Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. v. NLRB, 306 U. S.240, 4 L. R. R. M. 515 (1939).
In the 1954 hearings before the Senate Labor Committee, at least one
management representative raised a question with respect to the right of state
courts to hear cases involving violence and mass picketing. In a brief filed on
behalf of the Southern Coal Producers Association, the law firm of Gall, Lane
and Howe stated:
"In Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra at page 3, the Court noted that:
'Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes. We have held that the
State still may exercise "its historic powers over such traditionally local
matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways."
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, (315 U. S. 740, 749).'
"On its surface, this statement might seem to lay to rest any doubts
as to the power of the States to restrain breaches of the peace arising
out of labor disputes.
"Several factors, however, militate against complete reliance on the
quoted statement.
"Initially it should be observed that the Allen-Bradley Local case on
which the court relies was decided in 1952-prior to the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Board, supra,
also decided under'the Wagner Act, the court summarized its holding in
Allen-Bradley as follows (330 U. S. at p. 773):
"Today, however, the acts of violence and mass picketing involved in
Allen-Bradley would fall within the general proscription of section
8(b) (1) (A) of the amended Federal Act. See, In the Matter of H. N.
Thayer Co. (99 NLRB 1122 (1952)). Accordingly, to the extent that
the Allen-Bradley decision rests upon the absence of a Federal remedy,
its continued vitality is highly questionable. The same infirmity, of course,
afflicts the Garner dictum which relies upon Allen-Bradley.
"Moreover, as previously suggested, Mr. Justice Jackson's statement in
the Garner case which respect to the power of the States to restrain
breaches of the peace, is dictum. And the dictum itself appears to be
difficult to reconcile with the principal holding of the case. As we read
Garner v. Teamsters Union, the Court there held that where Federal
law provides a remedy for specified union misconduct, the States are not
free to supplement the Federal remedy by affording the same or different
relief through their own procedures." Hearins,supra note 4, at 3152.
This was denied in the statement made to the United States Supreme
Court by the NLRB:
"The Board recognizes, of course, as this court recently stated in Garner
v. Teamsters, etc., Union, 346 U. S.485, 488, that under the Act the states
"still may exercise '(their) historic powers over such traditionally local
matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and high-
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19 7
to indicate that Congress decided they should not be forbidden.

6. In situations where the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction a
federal court, on application of the Board, has the power to enjoin
a party from enforcing an injunction previously obtained in a state
19 s

court.

7. Where the Federal Act affords a remedy for the conduct
which constitutes the basis of the action, the NLRB does not have
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude the
state court from hearing and determining the issues in a common
law tort action based on this conduct according to a recent decision
by the United States Supreme Court in United Construction Workers v. LaBurnum Construction Co.199
An important question pending before the Supreme Court is:
May a state assert jurisdiction in an area in which the dispute affects interstate commerce, where the National Labor Relations Board has declined to assert jurisdiction?
ways.'" Appearing before the Senate Comittee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1953 the Board's then Chairman (Mr. Herzog) stated, 'There are,
of course, aspects of labor controversies which the States have traditionally been free to control. Although earlier witnesses have apparently
sought to convey a contrary impression, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 has not cut into that freedom. We speak of the inherent
police power of each sovereign State to deal with acts of violence or other
threats to the peace.' Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Taft-Hartley Act Revisions, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 4,
pp. 2123-2124, 2107. This statement continues to represent the Board's
present views.
"Although recognizing the States' authority to exercise their traditional
police powers in situations arising out of labor disputes, the Board
does not, however, regard itself in proceedings before it as bound by the
determination which a state court may make as to the legality or purpose of concerted action by employees for mutual aid or protection. H. N.
Thayer Co., 99 N. L. R. B. 1122, 112&-1131 (30 LRRM 1184)." 33 Lab.
Rel. Rep. 425 (1954).
197. Professor Cox, in his report to the Senate Labor Committee,
stated:
"The opinions leave some uncertainty concerning state power to deal
with strikes and picketing not forbidden by the Federal Statute, but so
closely related to activities dealt with in the N. L. R. A. as to indicate
that Congress decided they should not be forbidden, but it seems likely
that the court will hold the states powerless to interfere in these areas. Of
course, the states retain power to prevent violence and physical interference with property." Hearings, supra note 4, at 3402.
See cases decided since Garner case:
Willoughby Stores v. Ass'n of Machinists, 33 L. R. R. M. 2545 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1954); Wichita Falls R. R. v. Machinists Union, 33 L. R. R. M.
2609 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954) ; General Teleradio v. Manuti, 33 L. R. R. M.
2635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Building Trades Council v. Ledbetter Co., 33
L. R. R. M. 2659 (Ala. 1954) ; Teamsters v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 33
L. R. R. M. 2685 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954); Ozone Corp. v. Steel Warehousemen, 33 L. R. R. M. 2688 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
198. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 34 L. R. R. M. 2139 (U.S. 1954).
199. 34 L. R. R. No. 11 (June 7, 1954).
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This question has been noted but not passed upon by the Supreme Court. -00
With respect to State action in cases where the Board has declined to exercise its jurisdiction, the Board has not formally decided, or otherwise taken a position in cases of litigation in which
it has been involved. It has, however, as a matter of practice refrained from intervening in any way in situations where the states,
despite the absence of any cession agreement, have taken action
with respect to industries over which the Board as a matter of
policy declines to take jurisdiction.201
B. MinnesotaDecisions RegardingConflict of Jurisdiction.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has made two decisions with
respect to the problems involved in the conflict of jurisdiction between the Minnesota Labor Relations Act and the National Labor
Relations Act.
In the first of these decisions, Norris Grain Company v. Nordaas, 0°' the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state district
court did not have jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining
order where the complaint and record presented to the trial court
set forth facts which, on their face, constituted a secondary boycott. It stated:
"Secondary boycotts are within the scope of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 USCA Sec. 141 et seq., that the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such labor disputes
and that as a result, the state court had no jurisdiction to issue
the restraining order." (p. 115)
In the second decision, FaribaultDaily News v. International
Typographical Union, 0 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court held:

200. Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U. S. 393,

33 L. R. R. M. 2394, 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 425 (1954).

See President Eisenhower's recommendations on this problem contained
in his letter to Senator H. Alexander Smith. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 430 (1954).
See also proposals of the Senate Labor Committee. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 429
(1954).
201. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 425 (1954). See Almeida Bus Service, 99
N. L. R. B. 498, 500-501, 30 L. R. R. f. 1088 (1952). In addition, the
Board's practice in this respect is reflected in its action in NLRB v. New

York State Labor Relations Board, 106 F. Supp. 749, 30 L. R. R. M. 2414
(S.D. N. Y. 1952). There the Board sought to enjoin the New York State

Labor Relations Board from taking jurisdiction over certain taxicab companies over which the Board had asserted jurisdiction. While the case was
pending, the Board reconsidered its jurisdictional policy with respect to
taxicab companies and concluded that it would refrain from asserting jurisdiction over the type of companies involved in the action against the New
York Board. Following this change of policy, the National Board entered
into a stipulation with the State Board dismissing the action in the district
court.
203. 232 Minn. 91, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950).
204. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).
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"That, when interstate commerce is involved, the provisions of
the Minnesota Act which require a ten day notice of intention
to strike which is the only provision involved here, is invalid,
since it interferes with the rights guaranteed by Congress in
Section 7 of the Federal Act." (p. 324)
A third decision interpreting the Minnesota Act was by the
United States District Court in the Linde Air Products case.2- 5
The Court held that the office of the State Labor Conciliator did not
have concurrent jurisdiction in representation cases, and proceeded
to issue a restraining order against the State Labor Conciliator
from proceeding in a representation case involving an industry in
interstate commerce.
On the basis of the principles laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in the cases cited above, together with the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, a section by section analysis of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act will be made for the
purpose of determining which portions of the Minnesota Act can
still be applied to industries involved in interstate commerce.
C. Extent to which Specific Provisionsof the MinnesotaAct can be
Applied to Industries Subject to the Federal Act.
1. 179.06 Subdivision 1. Collective BargainingAgreements. Notice
of Intent to Strike or Lockout.
The Minnesota Supreme Court 206 has specifically held that the
provision of the Minnesota Act which requires a ten-day notice of
intention to strike is invalid as applied to industries involved in
interstate commerce.
It has not ruled on the validity of the provisions of the Minnesota Law requiring a ten-day notice of intention to make a change
in an existing agreement, to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, or to make changes with respect to rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions.
The Supreme Court in the FaribaultNews case was considering only an impediment on the right to strike. It could thus be
urged that the provisions requiring that notice be given to the
opposing party are valid as applied to industries in interstate commerce. It could also be argued that if one of the parties to a labor
dispute sees fit to give a notice to the Conciliator under the provisions of the Minnesota Act that the opposite party would have
an obligation to attend meetings called by the Conciliator even
though under the specific holding in the FaribaultNews case there
205. 77 F. Supp. 656 (D. Minn. 1948).
206. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).

1954]

LABOR RELATIONS ACT

would be no limitation on the right to impose a strike or a lockout
during the ten-day waiting period. Justification for this reasoning
could be found in the Federal Act 20 7 which requires that a copy of

the notice of dispute which is served on the United States Mediation
and Conciliation Service also be served on the State Labor Conciliator.
Despite the fact that most unions and most employers continue
to serve ten-day strike notices in the State of Minnesota and despite
the desirability of such a holding, it is questionable that either the
Minnesota Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court
would sustain the Minnesota Act in these respects. The Minnesota
Court has consistently spoken of the right to strike under Section
7 of the Federal Act as being an absolute one provided the provisions of the Federal Act are adhered to. In this connection, the
Court said:
"There can be no question that under the federal act, the employees under the facts of our case have an absolute right to
strike. The federal act permits peaceful strikes for lawful objectives without qualifications. The state act gives a conditional
or qualified right. Both acts cover the same field. Under the
decisions, it would seem that the state statute cannot impose a
conditional right on employees in interstate commerce where
the federal law gives an absolute right. The state act says to the
employes: 'You have the right to strike only if,' and then specifies the limitation or condition.
"The ten-day notice of intention to strike may be considered a
very salutary provision in connection with the preservation of
industrial peace, and therefore very material or something quite
so immaterial that the federal act or courts would take no
offense; but in either case it must be admitted that it places a
restriction on an otherwise unqualified right to strike." 20 8
There are a number of additional reasons why the validity of
these sections must be considered questionable with respect to industries involved in interstate commerce:
(1) Under the Federal Act, no notices of any type must be
given where there is not in effect a collective bargaining agreement.
(2) The Federal Act makes it a refusal to bargain and thus an
unfair labor practice if a copy of the notice required to be served
on the United States Mediation and Conciliation Service is not
served on the State Labor Conciliator.
(3) The notice provisions of the Minnesota Act, insofar as they
relate to the requirement to give notice to an opposing party are in
207. § 8(d) (3).
208. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 322-323, 53 N. W. 2d 36, 47 (1952).
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direct conflict with the Federal Act, both with respect to time requirement and circumstances under which the notices must be given.
2. 179.06 Subdivision 2. Assistance Notices.
The Minnesota Act provides that an assistance notice may be
filed by either party to a labor dispute with the State Labor Conciliator who is then given jurisdiction of the dispute. No cases have
arisen which have questioned the right of the State Labor Conciliator to compel the attendance of a party when an assistance notice
has been filed by the opposing party. This section of the Act does
not place any restrictions on the right to strike, as either party at
any time subsequent to the serving of the assistance notice has a
right to institute a strike or a lockout unless it is prohibited under
some other section of the state or federal act.
In view of the fact that no limitation on the right to strike is involved and that Congress has evidenced an intention to at least
keep state labor conciliators advised as to the progress of labor disputes within their states by requiring the notices referred to above,
it may be that the court, when faced with a specific problem, would
hold that assistance notices could be validly applied to industries
involved in interstate commerce.
3. 179.07 Labor Disputes Affecting Public Interest.
It is clear that under the decisions in the FaribaultNews case2°01
and Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board210 the entire fact finding procedure
under the Minnesota Act is invalid with respect to industries
involved in interstate commerce. This is true, not only because
this involves a restriction on an otherwise unqualified right to
strike, but because the provisions of the Minnesota Act are in
direct conflict with the provisions of the Federal Act in so far as
they empower fact finding commissions to make recommendations
with respect to the terms and conditions under which the dispute
should be settled. The Federal Act prohibits recommendations from
being made.
Just as it might be argued that under the provisions of Section
179.06 of the Minnesota Act the parties to a labor dispute are
under an obligation to meet with the State Labor Conciliator, but
are free to institute a strike irrespective of the provisions of the
Minnesota Act, it could also be argued that in industries involved
in interstate commerce, the parties would be required to submit to
209. Ibid.
210. 340 U. S. 383,27 L. R. R. M. 2385 (1951).
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a fact finding commission even though they could not be prevented
from instituting a strike or walkout during the waiting period established by the Minnesota Act.
4. 179.083 Jurisdictional Controversies.
Under the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in the Bethlehem Steel case21" and the Minnesota Supreme
Court in the Norris Grain case, 21- it would appear that inasmuch
as the NLRA specifically deals with the problem of jurisdictional
disputes this section of the Minnesota Act would be invalid as to
industries subject to the Federal Act.
5. 179.09 Arbitration.
Inasmuch as this section of the Minnesota Act is completely
voluntary, there is no reason why it cannot be applied to industries
involved in interstate commerce.
6. 179.10 Subdivision 1. Joining Labor Organizations;Uniting for
Collective Bargaining.
Under the doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court that a state may not curtail the rights of employees in businesses subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB to engage in con21 3
certed activities within the meaning of Section 7 of the NLRA,
it would appear that Section 179.10, to the extent that it is more
restrictive than the Federal Act, could not be applied to industries
in interstate commerce. In discussing this section, and the inclusion
of the word "lawful," the Minnesota Supreme Court stated :214
"It must be conceded that Section 7 of the federal act and Section 179.10, subd. 1, cover generally the same field of labor relations. Both acts provide that employees shall have the right of
self-organization, the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.... (p. 40)
"Section 7 of the federal act gives employees the right to strike,
without any conditions or strings attached to it, where there is
not in effect a collective bargaining contract." (p. 47)
7. 179.10 Subdivision2. Employer Associations.
It is difficult to imagine how an issue could arise under this
subdivision. The rights of an employer association would not be
211. 330 U. S. 767, 19 L. R. R. M. 2499 (1947).
212. Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950).
213. See note 193 supra.
214. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236

Miinn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).
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greater than the rights of an individual employer. Thus, in determining whether or not this section can be applied with respect to
industries involved in interstate commerce, the same test would
be used as was used in connection with subdivision 1.
8. 179.11 Unfair Labor Practices by Employees.
It has previously been pointed out that there are several general features of the Minnesota Act with respect to most unfair
labor practices which go substantially beyond the provisions of the
Federal Act. These are:
1. A number of unfair labor practices are made unlawful acts
under the Minnesota Act.2 15 This raises a question which has never

been discussed by the United States or the Minnesota Supreme
Court, that is, does the fact that the penalties established by the
Minnesota Act exceed the penalties established by the Federal Act
in and of itself invalidate certain sections of the Minnesota Act
with respect to industries which are subject to the Federal Act.
And if these sections of the Minnesota Act are invalid for this
reason, do the sections fall, or would the penalty alone be invalidated?
The fact that criminal penalties may be imposed under the
state law would probably cause the court to examine the section of
the state law in question more carefully than it would if the penalties
imposed were the same under both laws.
It could not easily be argued that Congress had not considered
the establishment of criminal penalties for violation of the Federal
Act, inasmuch as it did make it a criminal offense for a union to
make contributions to a welfare fund21 except under certain circumstances, and also made it a criminal offense to make political
contributions under certain circumstances.

21 7

2. The Minnesota Act makes individual employees, as well as
labor organizations and their agents, guilty of unfair labor practices and unlawful acts, as well as making them liable in suits for
damages. The constitutional problems raised by this vital difference
have never been discussed by the United States or the Minnesota
Supreme Court. It would seem clear, however, that the Supreme
Court would not be likely to permit a state to apply sections of a
state act, which it considered to be invalid as to a union, to the
individual members of the union. By the same token, however, it
215. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 217, 233 (1940).

216. § 302.

217. § 304.
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seems unlikely that the Court would find a section of a state law,
which was valid as to a union, invalid with respect to its individual
members.
3. Under the Minnesota Act, a state court is given the jurisdiction to issue injunctions and temporary restraining orders on the
application of private citizens who claim real or threatened injury. s This is in contrast to the Federal Act in two respects. First,
under the Federal Act, an individual is not permitted to seek a
restraining order or a temporary injunction. 219 The NLRB has the
e:xclusive right to seek this relief. Secondly, relief under the Federal
Act is obtained in an administrative tribunal which is constituted
for the purpose of handling all types of legal procedures. 22"
With the long and bitter history with respect to the abuse of
the temporary restraining order by state courts, the right to have
a preliminary investigation prior to the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by the NLRB may well be one of the most important rights that employees and employers both have. 221
The abuse of the temporary restraining order and injunction by
state courts, even in recent years, caused these conclusions and
recommendations to be made by the staff of the sub-committee on
Labor and Management Relationships :222
"Two principal conclusions may be drawn from the subcommittee's studies of State court labor injunctions: (1) They are
too frequently issued without regard to procedural standards
which are considered minimal in ordinary litigation, and (2)
they too frequently encroach upon activities which are either
protected by Federal law or which Congress has decided should
be free of regulation-particularly by the extreme and extraordinary remedy of summary prohibition by court decree.
(p.33)
"Three principal remedies suggest themselves.
"(A) The Congress should prescribe procedural rules such as
those in the Norris-LaGuardia Act for State court injunction
cases involving enterprises affecting interstate commerce. (p. 33)
"(B) Congress should exclude all State court actions in labor
disputes affecting interstate commerce. (p. 34)
218. § 179.14.
219. California Ass'n of Employers v. Building and Construction Trades

Council of Reno, 78 F. 2d 175, 25 L. R. R. M. 2111 (9th Cir. 1949).

220. A recent proposed amendment to the Federal Act would transfer

the function of prevention of unfair labor practices to the Federal Courts. 33
Lab. Rel. Rep. 333 (1954).
221. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F. 2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948).
222. Staff Report to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1954.
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"(C) Self-restraint on the part of State courts is the most
promising cure for the improper use of labor injunctions." (p.
34)
The United States Supreme Court recognized in the Garner
case 223 that a difference in procedure might be sufficient in and of
itself to sustain a finding that a State Act would be invalid as to
industries in interstate commerce when it said:
"A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are
quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications
as are different rules of substantive law. The same reasoning
which prohibits federal courts from intervening in such cases
except by way of review or on application of the federal board,
precludes state courts from doing so, and the reasons for excluding state administrative bodies from assuming control of
matters expressly placed within the competence 22of4 the federal
board also excludes state courts from like action.1

a. Subdivision1. Strikes in Violation of
Collective BargainingAgreements.
A strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement is an
unfair labor practice under both the Federal and State Acts; therefore, the Minnesota Act is invalid as applied to industries in inter225

state commerce.

There are no decisions as to whether the section of the Minnesota Act 228 making it an unfair labor practice to violate the terms
and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement can be applied
to industries covered by the Federal Act.
A number of problems are raised by this provision in as much as
Section 301 of the Federal Act permits suits in United States District Court for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce. The major problems are:
1. Does the United States District Court have exclusive jurisdiction of actions arising out of breach of collective bargaining
agreements?
2. May an individual employee still maintain an action because
of the breach of a collective bargaining agreement by the employer,
e.g., a suit for back wages? If so, is he permitted to maintain the action in Federal Court or is he limited to an action in state court?
223. 346 U. S. 485, 33 L. R. R. M. 2218 (1953).
224. 74 S. Ct 161, 166 (1953).
225. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).
226. §§ 179.11(1), 179.12(1).
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3. Insofar as the Minnesota Act makes it an unfair labor
practice to violate the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining
agreement, can it be applied to industries involved in interstate
commerce?
There are no decisions by the Minnesota or United States
Supreme Court on any of these questions, and the lower courts are
divided.
Thus it has been held that an employer still has a right to main-

tain an action in a state court against a union for injunctive relief
based on an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 22
The court said:
"Congress clearly indicated that it did not regard recourse to the
United States Courts for the enforcement of the valid provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement as an impingement upon the
power of the National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair
labor practices defined in Section 8 of the Act or of any other
power or duty with which it clothed it. We have been given no
reason for denying to State Courts jurisdiction in the same field.
If any implication can be drawn from the provision conferring
jurisdiction upon the United States Courts, we think it would
be that Congress recognized that the field was appropriate for
judicial intervention, and, for that reason, clothed the district
courts with jurisdiction so that they would be in a position to
share in the added burden. We fail to find any word or combination of words indicating an intent to exclude the state courts or
to draw to the United States District Courts the exclusive jurisdiction.
"The language of the Act is permissive and non-exclusionary.
We discover
no intent to use 'may' in order than its ordinary
228
sense.'

New York Courts have held, however, that one union does not
have a right to maintain an action against another union for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement, as exclusive jurisdiction of
such disputes were given to Federal Courts under Section 301 of the
Federal Act. 22'
227. General Electric Co. v. International Union United Auto. Workers,
93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N. E. 2d 211, 30 L. R. R. M. 2607 (1952). See also
Shirley-Herman Co. v. Hod Carriers Union, 182 F. 2d 806, 26 L. R. R. M.
2258 (2d Cir. 1950) where the court held that § 301 not only provided a
procedural right but actually created a right where one did not previously
exist.
228. General Electric Co. v. International Union United Auto. Workers,
93 Ohio App. 139, 156, 108 N. E. 2d 211, 221-222, 30 L. 1t R. M. 2607, 26142615 (1952).
229. Fitzgerald v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 28 L. R. R. M. 2611 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct 1951); Fey v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278,

28 L. R. R. M. 2103 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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A recent 4-3 decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals"o
held that the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction under Section
301 of an action by a union for a declaratory judgment of rights
under a collective bargaining agreement and for an accounting of
salaries wrongfully withheld.
The Court discussed Section 301 in detail:
"In summary, we hold that the employer's duty to pay a certain
rate arises out of the collective bargaining contract, plus the
sanctions of the labor relations Act. The duty to pay a particular
employee wages in the sum resulting from such rate arises out
of the individual contract of hire. The latter is the duty alleged
here, and, therefore, Section 301 (a) is not involved since there
is no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization. Concequently, we have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. For the same reason the prayer for declaratory
relief as to the meaning of this term of the collective contract
must meet a like fate." (p. 630)
Footnote 16: "On the question whether Section 301 has made
the federal courts the exclusive forum to determine cases involving collective bargaining contracts between employers and
labor organizations representing employees in an industry affecting commerce, it is significant that in the tort section of the
Labor Management Relations Act, Section 303, in the jurisdictional grant, Congress said that the party injured by the proscribed conduct 'may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States * * * or in any other court hauing jurisdiction of
the parties * *

*"

(Emphasis added). Sec. 303(b). There is no

such choice of forums under Section 301, seemingly indicating
that Congress intended to preempt to the federal courts litigation
on collective bargaining contracts." (p. 629)
A vigorous dissent pointed out:
"The first question is whether Section 301 (a) of the LaborManagement-Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) 1946 ed.,
Supp. V, which confers upon federal district courts jurisdiction
of 'suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce * * *' is applicable to this controversy. This action

is ex contractu. The adequate involvement of commerce is unquestioned, but the rights asserted as the basis of relief are
beneficially the alleged several rights of a great number of defendant's employees to receive a day's pay for a day on which
they did not work. The company argues that its refusal to pay
these employees, if actionable at all, must be attacked as a breach
of the individual contracts of hire, a matter beyond federal cognizance. Cf. Christiansen v. Local 680, 1940, 126 N. J. Eq. 508,
10 A. 2d 168 (5 LRRM 928). This court now accepts that
reasoning, treating as decisive the undeniable fact that the obli230. Ass'n of Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. 2d 623, 33
L. R. R. M. 2462 (3d Cir. 1954).
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gation to pay any particular workman in accordance with the
union contract depends upon his individual hiring as well as the
collective bargain. I believe the court does not regard the time
sequence of these contracts as consequential. I agree that this
dual contracting shows that the individual workman can found
a common law action for pay upon the terms of his employment
without even attempting to make the matter one of federal cognizance under Section 301 (a). But in the present circumstances
I think the existence of this individual common law right does
not prevent the refusal to pay from also being a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and, as such, within federal
jurisdiction as extended by Section 301 (a). (p. 630)
"If in this process the union should succeed in winning as it
sought here, a judicial determination establishing the alleged
right of all employees under the collective bargaining contract
to be paid for days of voluntary absence, the question would remain whether any money judgment could properly be rendered
without joinder or intervention of individual beneficiaries. Some
of the above cited cases go that far, treating the plaintiff maker
of a third party beneficiary contract as a fiduciary who may
obtain a money award for distribution among the beneficiaries.
It is not necessary to pass upon that issue here because the district court rightly concluded that the contract in suit did not
create such an obligation as the union asserts in this suit. And
since the majority does not reach this point at all, I express no
opinion on the matter of necessary parties beyond saying that
the union suing alone can obtain an effective declaration of the
rights and obligations created by the collective bargaining contract, including any created for the benefit of the workmen as
individuals." (p. 632)
It seems quite clear that most of the questions raised will be
determined by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, this section
of the Minnesota Act must be considered as of doubtful validity, at
least insofar as it is made an unfair labor practice to violate the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
b. Subdivision 2. Strikes in Violation of Notice Provisions.
This subdivision making strikes in violation of the ten-day strike
notice provisions, or public interest provisions, an unfair labor
practice, is clearly invalid with respect to industries in interstate
2 31

commerce.

c. Subdivision 3. The Unlawful Seizure of
PropertyDuringa Labor Dispute.
This subdivision would probably be valid as an exercise of the
police power. This may be true despite the fact that the National
231. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).
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Labor Relations Board has indicated that it has the power to prevent the type of conduct declared unfair by this section.23 2 The National Labor Relations Board indicated in the Thayer case, 23 3 however, it would not necessarily be bound by the decision of the state
court that the conduct did amount to an unlawful seizure.
d. Subdivision4. Picketing by Non-Employees
While a Strike is in Progress.
The prohibition against picketing, under this Subdivision, is of
doubtful validity. 234 It would, of course, be argued that this type of
prohibition was enacted to help insure peaceful picketing, the argument being that employees would be less prone to commit violence
on the picket lines than non-employees. The language used by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the Faribault News case indicates
that the Minnesota Supreme Court would hold this section to be invalid with respect to industries in interstate commerce. There they
quoted with approval the O'Brien case23 5 and the Amalgamated
case.

236

"The strike here involved is a peaceful strike for a lawful purpose and affects employers and employees engaged in interstate
commerce. It is not a case where the strike or picketing is for
an unlawful purpose or where there is violence or threats of
violence." (p. 323)
e. Subdivision 5. The Use of More than one Picket
at an Entrancewhere No Strike is in Progress.
The type of limitation contained in this subdivision is similar to
the limitation contained in Subdivision 4. The validity of this subdivision with respect to industries involved in interstate commerce
rests on substantially the same grounds as that of Subdivision 4. It
must, then, be put in the doubtful class as far as validity is concerned.
f. Subdivision 6. Interferencewith the Operation of a
Vehicle or the OperatorThereof When the Operator
is Not a Party to the Strike.
If it were not for the fact that this subdivision implies that it is
permissible for certain types of interference with the driver or oper232. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 306 U. S. 240,4 L. R. R. M.
515 (1939).
233. H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N. L. R. B.1122, 30 L. R. R. M. 1184 (1952).
234. See note 197 supra.

235. Automobile Workers Union v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 26
L. R. R. M. 2082 (1950).
236. Amalgamated Ass'n St Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, 27 L. R. R. M. 2385 (1951).
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ator of a vehicle when they are a party to a strike, this clause would
probably be valid under the same theory as Subdivision 3. In view
of the fact, however, that a distinction seems to be drawn between the
type of interference which is permitted when the operator is a party
to the strike and when he is not a party to the strike, it may very
well be that this subdivision would be valid or invalid, depending on
the construction of the word "interference." To the extent that the
interference involved physical interference, it would appear that this
subdivision could be applied to industries involved in interstate
commerce; but to the extent that it did not involve physical violence
of any type and only involved interference of a nature which would
be valid under the Federal Act, it would be in the doubtful class.
g. Subdizision 8. Secret Strike Votes.
Under the decision in the O'Brien case,237 this section of the
Minnesota Act is clearly invalid with respect to industries involved
in interstate commerce. In the O'Brien case, the court said:
"Congress safeguarded the exercise by employees of 'concerted
activities' and expressly recognized the right to strike. It qualified and regulated that right in the 1947 Act. It established certain prerequisites, with which appellants complied, for any strike
over contract termination or modification, Sec. 8(d). These include notices to both state and federal mediation authorities;
both did participate in the negotiation in this case. In provisions
which did not affect appellants, Congress forbade strikes for
certain objectives and detailed procedures for strikes which
might create a national emergency. Sec. 8(b) (4), 206-210.
None of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent
state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress
occupied this field and closed it to state regulation." (p. 457)
h. Subdivision 9. The Interference with the Production,
Transportation,... by a Producerof AgriculturalProducts.
To the extent that this subdivision seeks to prevent physical violence of any type, it could be validly applied to industries in interstate commerce.2 38 To the extent, however, that it attempts to outlaw secondary or primary picketing, or other activities, its validity
would rest on the same basis as the other employee unfair labor
practices which have been previously discussed.
237. Automobile Workers Union v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 26
L. R. R. M. 2082 (1950).
238. See Note 196 supra.
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9. 179.12 Unfair Labor Practicesby Employers.
a. Subdivisions1 and 2. Lockouts in Violation of
a Collective BargainingAgreement and Breaches of
Collective BargainingAgreements.
The validity of these subdivisions as applied to industries in
interstate commerce would be determined under the same principles
discussed with reference to Section 179.11 (1), (2) .2-0
b. Subdivision 3. To Encourageor DiscourageMembership
in any Labor Organization.
To the extent that this subdivision permits various forms of
union security agreements which are permitted by the Federal Act
it is valid. To the extent, however, that it relates to other forms of
discrimination, it could not be applied to industries in interstate
commerce as the Federal Act contains a provision which regulates
240

the same type of conduct.

c. Subdivision4. To DiscriminateAgainst an Employee
for Giving Testimony Under the Act.
In order for the provisions of this subdivision to be applied, an
employee would have to give testimony under the Act in connection
with another section of the Act. Thus, the validity or invalidity of
this section would depend on whether the original proceeding was
one in which state could properly exercise jurisdiction.2 4 '
d. Subdivisions 5 and 6. To Spy or to Blacklist.
The Federal Act does not specifically make it an unfair labor
practice to spy or blacklist. The Board, however, has held that such
conduct is an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (1) of the
Federal Act. In view of the fact that the Federal Act has been held
to prohibit this specific conduct, these subdivisions could not be
2 42
validly applied to industries in interstate commerce.
10. 179.13 Interferencewith Roads, Methods of Transportation,
and Wrongful Obstruction of Ingress to and Egress
from Any Place of Business.
The validity or invalidity of this section rests upon the same
239. Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union, 236
Minn. 303, 53 N. W. 2d 36 (1952).
240. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 33 L. R. R. A. 2218
(1953) ; Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U. S. 393,
33 L. R. R. M. 2394 (1954).
241. See note 240 supra.
242. Ibid.
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grounds as Subdivisions 3, 6 and 9 of 179.11. The principles discussed under those sections are equally applicable here.
11. 179.135 Protectionof Collective BargainingAgreements.
This section of the Minnesota Act prohibits an officer, business
agent, or representative of a union from requiring an employer to
negotiate when the employer is already under contract to another
union.
The Federal Act has no provisions which are comparable to this
section of the Minnesota Act. The Federal Act, however, does legislate in a closely related field.2 43 The question, therefore, is whether
Congress attempted to pre-empt the field by legislating with respect
to it, even though the legislation is not as comprehensive as that of
the Minnesota Act. In view of the fact that this specific problem has
not been decided either by the United States Supreme Court or the
Minnesota Supreme Court, this section must be considered in the
doubtful category.
12. 179.14 and 179.15 Injunctionsand
TemporaryRestraining Orders.
The validity of this section could not, of course, be tested directly. A complete discussion with respect to the problems which
are raised by this section is contained elsewhere in this article.
13. 179.16 Representativesfor Collective Bargaining.
Concurrent jurisdiction in representation cases is prohibited
with respect to industries involved in interstate commerce.2 44
14. 179.18 through179.25 - The Labor Union DemocracyAct.
The Federal Act does not attempt to regulate the internal affairs
of local unions or international unions to the extent that is attempted in the Labor Union Democracy Act. The only requirements
of the Federal Act are the furnishing of certain financial and other
information, and the signing by the officers of the union of non2 45
Communist affidavits.
Two questions are therefore raised with respect to the Labor
Union Democracy Act.
1. Do the regulations of the Minnesota Act come within the
protected activity of Section 7 of the National Act? In this connec243. § 8(b) (4) (B), (C).

244. Linde Air Products Co. v. Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 656 (D. Minn.

1948).
245. § 9(f), (g), (h).
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tion, the only case on the problem which has been decided by the
United States Supreme Court is Hill v. Florida.2 46 There the United
States Supreme Court held invalid a provision which required that
business agents of unions be licensed. The Supreme Court stated:
"Since the Labor Board has held that an employer must bargain
with a properly selected union agent despite his failure to secure
a Florida license, it is argued that the state law does not interfere with the collective bargaining process. But here, this agent
has been enjoined, and if the Florida law is valid he could be
found guilty of a contempt for doing that which the act of Congress permits him to do. Furthermore, he could, under Section
14 of the state law, be convicted of a misdemeanor and subjected
to fine and imprisonment. The collective bargaining which Congress has authorized contemplates two parties free to bargain,
and cannot thus be frustrated by state legislation. We hold that
Section 4 of the Florida Act is repugnant to the National Labor
Relations Act." (p. 542)
The Court also said:
"The declared purpose of the Wagner Act, as shown in its first
section is to encourage collective bargaining, and to protect the
'full freedom' of workers in the selection of bargaining representatives of their own choice. To this end Congress made it
illegal for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in selecting their representatives. Congress attached no
conditions whatsoever to their freedom of choice in this respect.
Their own best judgment, not that of someone else, was to be
their guide. 'Full freedom' to choose an agent means freedom to
pass upon that agent's qualifications." (p. 541)
The Florida Act can, of course, be distinguished from the Minnesota Act in that Florida attempted to set itself up as a judge of
whether or not a person was fit to represent employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. The Minnesota Act does not attempt
to go that far. In one important respect, however, it is similar to the
Florida law since under both laws a violation constitutes a misdemeanor.
2. Did Congress pre-empt the field by adopting the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947?
Hill v. Florida was decided prior to the passage of the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947. Thus, there was no question of
Congress having pre-empted the field with respect to the regulation
of the affairs of unions. With the passage of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, the problem of pre-emption is also raised.
An additional problem in connection with the Minnesota Act is
246.

Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 16 L. R. R. M. 734 (1944).
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whether it applies only to those unions which do business exclusively
in the State of Minnesota, or does it apply to local unions and international unions who may have members in more than one state.
If an effort were made to apply the Act to international unions,
or to local unions having members in more than one state, it is hard
to imagine the basis on which the court could sustain the Act. The
problem of regulating the internal affairs of local unions functioning
in more than one state is so obviously a national problem that the
court either under the doctrine of Hill v. Floridaor under the theory
of preemption would strike the law down.
15. 179.40 to 179.47. Secondary Boycott.
The extent to which the so-called secondary boycott provisions
of the Minnesota Act can be applied to industries in interstate commerce has been left somewhat in doubt not only by the United States
Supreme Court but also by the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.
It is clear from the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
the Norris Grain case- 47 that to the extent the Federal Act covers
the field of boycotts which are also prohibited by the State Act
the State Act cannot be applied to industries in interstate commerce.
It is also clear that in determining whether or not the State Act can
be applied, the question is not whether the NLRB has acted in the
specific case or what its actions will be, but rather whether Congress
has asserted the power to regulate the particular relationship.
The Minnesota Supreme Court made this point very clear in a
footnote attached to the original decision on the case.
"Since argument on this case, our attention has been called to
the case of Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. N.L.R.B.,
D.C. Cir., 186 F.2d 326, CCH, 6 Labor Law Rep. (4 ed.) par.
65, 949. The above case contains a long and comprehensive discussion of the question of secondary and primary boycotts, in
which many of the authorities are collected. It is, however, of
little help here.
"The question here is not whether we are dealing with a primary
or secondary boycott, but whether our state courts or N.L.R.B.
has the power to make such decision. There seems to be no doubt
that respondent here is engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The ultimate question then is - do the facts complained
of fall within the field covered by the National Labor Act? If so,
our courts have no jurisdiction to act in determining whether
such acts are unfair labor practices." (p. 108)
247. 232 Minn. 91, 46 N. W. 2d 94 (1950).
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On a petition for a re-argument the Supreme Court again made
this point clear.
"In order that our position may be completely clarified, it was
and is our holding that the complaint and record presented to
the trial court upon which an ex parte restraining order was
issued present facts which, on their face, constitute a secondary
boycott; that respondent is engaged in interstate commerce; that
secondary boycotts are within the scope of the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 141 et seq.; that the National Labor Relations
Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such labor dispute; and
that as a result the state court had no jurisdiction to issue the
restraining order." (p. 115)
The Minnesota Supreme Court. has, however, indicated that if
the picketing is in fact not covered by the Federal Act its decision may not be the same as it was in the Norris Grain case.
"In support of its petition for rehearing, respondent has cited
several cases in which the courts have held that picketing which
is primary is not covered by the federal act under the circumstances there disclosed, even though such picketing might incidentally affect an innocent employer. We have no quarrel with
those decisions. Respondent's difficulty here is that the court's
order is based upon a complaint and record which is entirely
inconsistent with any holding of primary picketing. It would
serve no useful purpose to review all authorities cited by respondent. Reference to a few should suffice to show how inconsistent respondent's position is." (p. 114)
In an earlier section of this article, the differences in scope of the
Minnesota Secondary Boycott Act and the secondary boycott provisions of the Federal Act have been pointed out.
Whether the sections of the Minnesota Act which purport to
regulate activities that are not specifically regulated by the Federal
Act can be applied to industries in interstate commerce is highly
doubtful. The basic questions to be answered by the courts are
whether:
(1) The activities prohibited by the State Act are so closely
related to the activities dealt with in the Federal Act as to indicate
that Congress decided they should not be forbidden.
(2) The activities which are being carried on by the employees
would be considered protected activities under Section 7 of the
)Federal Act.
IV.

JURISDICTIONAL POLICY OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

It is not within the scope of this analysis to make a detailed examination of the cases in which the Board has exercised its juris-
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diction. The purpose is to point out the bases upon which the Board
has exercised its jurisdiction, and the practical results of the Board's
policy in Minnesota.
In 1950 the Board set up nine standards which were to govern
its exercise of jurisdiction2

4

8

"1. Instrumentalities and channels of interstate and foreign
commerce (for example, radio systems) .249
25
"2. Public utility and transit systems. "
"3. Establishments which operate as integral parts of a multistate enterprise (for example, chain stores, and branch divisions of national or interstate organizations) .21
"4. Enterprises which produce or handle goods destined for
out-of-state shipment, or performing services outside a
state, 5 if
the goods or services are valued at $25,000 a
2
year.-

Enterprises which furnish services or materials necessary
to the operation of enterprises falling categories 1, 2 and 4
above, provided such goods or services are valued at
$50,000 a year.25 3
"6. Any other enterprise which has:
(a) a direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a

"5.

year254 or

(b)
(c)

an indirect inflow of material valued at $1,000,000 a

year,2

5

or

a combination inflow or outflow of goods which add
up to at least a total of '100o" of the amounts
re25 6
quired in items 4, 5, 6 (a) and (b) above.

248. 26 L. R. R. M. 50, 51 (1950).

"'The Board has long been of the opinion that it would better effectuate
the purposes of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases,
not to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible under the
authority delegated to it by Congress, but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose operations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a
pronounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce. This policy
should in our opinion, be maintained.'
"The Board thereby reiterated its policy of not exercising jurisdiction,
despite its power to do so, over business operations so local in character
that a labor dispute would be unlikely to 'have a sufficient impact upon
interstate commerce to justify an already burdened Federal Board in expending time, energy and public funds."'
249. WBSR, Inc., 91 N. L. R. B. 630, 26 L. R. R. Al. 1544 (1950).
250. Local Transit Lines, 91 N. L. R.B. 623, 26 L. R. R. M. 1547 (1950).
251. Borden Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 628, 26 L. R. R. M. 1546 (1950).
252. Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., Ltd., 91 N. L. R. B. 618,
26 L. R. R. M. 1548 (1950).
253. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 635, 26 L. R. R. M. 1543
(1950).
254. Federal Dairy, Inc., 91 N. L. R. B. 638, 26 L. R. R. M. 1538 (1950).
255. Dora's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 N. L. R. B. 632, 26 L. R.R. M.
1545 (1950).
256. Rutledge Paper Products, Inc., 91 N. L. R. B. 625, 26 L. R. R. M.
1544 (1950).
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"7. Establishments substantially affecting national defense."' 7
In response to a recent request of the United States Supreme
Court for an explanation of its jurisdictional policies, the NLRB
stated that it is currently engaged in a "comprehensive re-examination" of the nine jurisdictional standards laid down in 1950.258 This
process of re-examination is reflected in a series of recent decisions
where the Board has stated that it will not continue to exercise its
jurisdiction over all enterprises which under previous Board decisions might have been regarded as falling within categories 2, 5, or
9 of the 1950 standards. 25 9 Thus, the Board has ruled that it will not
continue to exercise jurisdiction over such public utilities as rural
electric cooperatives which are essentially local in character,2 6 0 local
transit or transportation systems, 261 or enterprises which, although
performing services in connection with interstate instrumentalities,
or performing services for concerns falling in categories 1, 2 or 4,
have a comparatively remote or insubstantial impact upon commerce. 26 2 The Board has also ruled that in exercising jurisdiction
over establishments affecting national defense, it will require a showing of a more direct and substantial relationship to the national defense than it had required in earlier cases.2 6 3 As to enterprises cov-

ered by the other categories, the Board, pending the results of
further study, is, in general, continuing to apply those standards, as
it has in the past, for the purpose of determining whether to assert
jurisdiction.
257. Westport Moving &Storage Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 902, 26 L. R. R. M.

1581 (1950).
258. Memorandum of N. L.R. B. to United States Supreme Court, 33
Lab.Rel. Rep. 424 (1954). This request was made by the Supreme Court in
the Laburnum case. 22 U. S.L.Week 3193 (U.S.Jan. 19. 1954).
259. 33 Lab. Rel. Rep. 424 (1954).
260. Inter-County Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 106 N. L. R. B.
No.238, 33 L.R.R. M. 1010 (1953).
261. San Jose City Lines, 106 N. L.R.B. No.201, 32 L.R.R. M. 1644
(1953) ; Auburn Bus Co., 107 N. L.R. B. 182, 33 L.R. R. M. 1261 (1954).
262. Checker Taxi Co., 107 N. L. R. B. No. 85, 33 L. R. R. M. 1119
(Dec. 4, 1953) ; Checker Taxi Co., 107 N. L. R. B. No.181, 33 L. R. R. M.
1261 (Jan. 21, 1954) ; Brooks Wood Products, 107 N. L. R. B. No. 71, 33
L. R. R. M. 1104 (Nov.30, 1953) ;Casey Welding Works, 107 N. L. R. B.
No.185, 33 L. R. R. M. 1272 (Jan.25, 1954) ; American Coin Lock Co., 107
N. L. R. B. No.88, 33 L. R. R. M. 1135 (Dec. 15, 1953).
263. Taichert's, Inc., 107 N. L. R. B. No.167, 33 L. R. R. M. 1240 (Jan.
13, 1954); McArthur Jersey Farm Dairy, 107 N. L. R. B. No. 171, 33
L. R. R. M. 1260 (Jan.18, 1954) ;Alpine Mill & Lumber Co., 107 N. L. R. B.
No.172, 33 L. R. R. M. 1264 (Jan.20, 1954) ;Ideal Laundry & Dry Cleaners,
107 N. L. R. B. No.186, 33 L. R. R. M. 1271 (Jan.25, 1954) ; Casey Welding
Works,107 N. L. R. B. No.185, 33 L. R. R. M. 1272 (Jan.25, 1954).
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V. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NLRB AND THE STATE LABOR
CONCILIATOR HAVE EXERCISED JURISDICTION IN MINNESOTA

Ever since the enactment of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act,
the NLRB and the Office of the State Labor Conciliator have both
functioned in the State of Minnesota. While statistics with respect
to the number of cases handled by the state agency and the federal
agency do not in any way determine the advisability of extending or
contracting the jurisdiction of either one, the statistics do, in some
way, help to indicate that both agencies have been rendering a rather
substantial service to both employers and employees in the state.

Industry

Representation Total Number of Number of
Petitions
Employees Involved Employees
Filed in
in Petitions Filed
in Unit
Minnesota
with NLRB in
in 1953
1953
N.L.R.B. State
Federal
State

Manufacturing ...........
Wholesale ...............
Retail ...................
Service ..................
Public Utility ............
Food Processing .........
Franchised Auto Dealers ..
Mining ..................
Distributors ..............
Engineering & Research ..
Printing .................
Warehousing .............
Transportation ...........
Radio Station ............
Office Building ...........
Hospitals ................
Franchised Beverage Dist..

91
15
12
11
5
5
7
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1

13
4
27
32

74,846
18,518
7,545
200
738
327
154
8,341

4,416
257
1,921
108
180
251
58
325

215
34
35
832
210
25

77
26
17
47
36
15

65
112,085

42
7,776

4

1

58

7
166

88

386
51
370
289

6
640
1,800

A review of both the federal and state cases which go to make up
the above totals indicates very clearly that in general, the state
tends to handle those cases which involve the smaller number of
employees. In most instances, where only a small number of employees are involved in a Federal election, a craft severance has
been petitioned for.
One fact is extremely clear from these reports, and that is that
if the jurisdictional lines are to be substantially changed either way,
additional personnel will be required by whichever agency receives
the additional jurisdiction.
The figures with respect to the results of the elections are equally enlightening.
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DISPOSITION
By Consent Election .................................
By Board Order .....................................
By Withdrawal ......................................
Determination without Election .......................
Pending ............................................
TOTALS ............................
Positive Certification ................................
Negative Certification ................................

Federal
94
27
39

State
29
10
21
23
5
88
43
9

6
166
98
20

Inasmuch as the Minnesota State Labor Conciliator does not
have jurisdiction over employee or employer unfair labor practices,
there is no basis for comparing the experience of the NLRB in
Minnesota with the state practice. All that can be done is to review
the experience of the NLRB in this field.
In 1953, 36 unfair labor practice charges were filed against employers in the State of Minnesota. Of these, 16 were withdrawn, 11
were settled by an agreement between the parties and the Board,
and 3 were dismissed. The remainder of the cases were pending
at the year's end. In this field, as in the representation cases, the
bulk of the charges were filed in the manufacturing industry with
only a small number of cases being filed in each of the other industries.
With respect to unfair labor practices involving charges against
a union only 7 cases were filed in 1953. Of these 7 cases, 2 were
withdrawn and the remainder were settled either by an agreement
between the parties or by an agreement between the parties and
the Board.
The limitations of space in this article make it impossible to
make an extensive analysis of all of the conciliation and mediation
cases handled by the State Labor Conciliator's office in 1953 and the
cases handled by the United States Mediation and Conciliation
Service in the same year. 2 "6 In view, however, of the extensive
discussions with respect to the President's proposal for permitting
264. State statistics:

1939-1940

Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................
Total .........................................

1940-1941

Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices .....................
Number of Lockout Notices .......................
Total .........................................

553
135

5

693
421
89

3

513

1954]

791

LABOR RELATIONS ACTS

the states to intervene in emergency disputes where the health,
welfare or safety of their citizens are involved, it is interesting to
review that situation with respect to Fact Finding Commissions
tinder the Minnesota Act.
1941-1942
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

559
124
4

Total .........................................
1942-1943
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

687

Total .........................................
1943-1944
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

351

Total .........................................
1944-1945
Number of Strike Notices ..........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

258

Total .........................................
1945-1946
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

237

Total .........................................
1946-1947
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

587

235
115
1

150
106
2

161
75
1

463
122
2

681
144
65

Total .........................................
1947-1948
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

890

Total .........................................
1948-1949
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

850

Total .........................................
1949-1950
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................
Number of Lockout Notices ........................

944

614
210
26

722
202
20

769
204
33

Total ......................................... 1,006
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In 1948, 41 Commissions were appointed, 2 1 of which 16 were
in the construction field and the balance distributed between the
service trades, manufacturing and transportation services. In 1949,
32 Fact Finding Commissions were appointed with the industry
distribution being approximately the same as 1948 with one exception, and that is, that in that year, three Fact Finding Commissions were appointed in public utilities. In 1950, ten Fact Finding Commissions were appointed, with the industry distribution
being substantially the same as they were in the prior two years.
In 1951, ten Commissions were again appointed. In 1952, eleven
Commissions were named, and in 1953, only three Commissions
were named, those being, the Duluth-Superior Transit Company,
which operates the local bus transportation system for the City of
Duluth; the Federal Cartridge Company, which is a federal defense plant; and the Franklin Heating Station of Rochester.
Since 1948, of the 107 Fact Finding Commissions appointed,
fourteen of them have been appointed in manufacturing industries,
1950-1951

Number of Strike Notices ......................... 714
Number of Assistance Notices ...................... 165
Number of Lockout Notices ........................
2
Total .........................................

881

1951-1952
Number of Strike Notices .........................
980
Number of Assistance Notices ...................... 167
Number of Lockout Notices ........................ 18

Total ......................................... 1,165
1952-1953
Number of Strike Notices .........................
Number of Assistance Notices ......................

Number of Lockout Notices ........................

999
187

17

Total ......................................... 1,203
265. Fact finding commissions were appointed in 1948 with respect to
the following employers: Graphic Arts Ind.; Rochester Dairy; Ace Trans-

portation Co.; Minneapolis Retail Plumbers Ass'n; Heating and Piping
Ass'n; Minneapolis Retail Plumbers; Minneapolis Painting Contr.; 140
Restaurants, Duluth; Cleaners & Launderers Inst., Minneapolis; Launderers
& Dry Cleaners, St. Paul; 13 Transfer Cos., Duluth; 23 T. C. Bakeries;
A. G. C. St. Paul Bldrs. Div.; 8 Building Material Firms; 3 Concrete
Cos.; 9 Sand & Gravel Cos.; Eating Places, Intl. Falls; Heating & Piping
Contractors; M. & 0. Paper Co., Intl. Falls; 36 Lumber Cos., Minneapolis;
Building Material Cos.; Ready Mixed Concrete Cos., Minneapolis; 5 Concrete Block Cos.; 7 Sand & Gravel Cos., Minneapolis; Northern Fruit Jobbers Ass'n, Duluth; Engineering Research Ass'n; 28 Lumber Dealers, Minneapolis; No. Fruit Jobbers Ass'n, Duluth; 24 Major & Indep. Oil Cos., St.
Paul; 16 Oil Cos., Minneapolis; A. G. C. Twin Cities Bldrs. Div.; St. Paul
Home Bldrs. Div.; Minneapolis Contractors & Bldrs. Ass'n; Whitney's,
Duluth; 13 Milling Cos., T. C.; Priority Mills, Minneapolis; Swift & Co.,
Minneapolis; Morell & Co.. Minneapolis - Armour & Co., Minneapolis; Minneapolis Star &Tribune; N. W. Publications, Inc.
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three in the food and dairy manufacturing industries, three in the
transportation industry, twenty-four in construction, thirty in services industries, five in food manufacturing, twenty-two in trade
industries, principally retailers of various commodities, one in the
wholesale trade industry, four in public utilities and one involving
private utilities.
The present policy of the State Labor Conciliator is to recommend the appointment of Fact Finding Commissions in three types
of situations:
1. In utilities;
2. In those situations in which the entire community depends
on a particular industry;
3. In those cases in which both parties feel that a Fact Finding
Commission would substantially contribute to the solving of their
problems. In this category, there is a great reluctance on the part
of the Conciliator to appoint a Commission because of his feeling
that they can be more effective if only a few are appointed.
The small number of Commissions appointed in the utility industries is probably brought about to a large extent by the fact that
a good many utilities in the State of Minnesota have provisions in
their contract providing for compulsory arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION

The basic provisions of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act are
no longer applicable to industries which are subject to the Federal
Act: Thus the ten-day strike notice provision; the provisions with
respect to the appointment of fact finding commissions; the representation sections of the Act; a majority of the unfair labor practices sections; and the secondary boycott provisions are clearly
invalid.
Legislation is now being proposed in the Congress of the United
States which would have the effect, if passed, of enlarging the jurisdiction of the state with respect to industries involved in interstate
commerce.
In seeking to determine the advisability and effect of such legislation with respect to the situation in Minnesota, it is important
to keep these factors in mind.
There are a number of basic differences in concept or approach
between the Federal Act and the Minnesota Act. The more important differences are:
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1. The concept under the Minnesota Act of considering certain
unfair labor practices unlawful acts.
2. The concept under the Minnesota Act of holding an individual employee, as distinguished from a labor organization, guilty of
unfair labor practices and unlawful acts, and liable in suits for
damages.
3. The concept under the Minnesota Act of court handling of
unfair labor practices as distinguished from handling by administrative tribunals.
4. The concept of granting practically unlimited powers to the
State Labor Conciliator and permitting extremely broad discretion in their exercise.
5. The combination under the Minnesota Act of mediation and
conciliation functions in the hands of the persons responsible for
the administration of the certification and unfair labor practices
sections of the Act.
Not only is there a difference in concept or approach between
the acts, but there are a number of extremely important substantive
differences between them.
In view of the differences in concept or approach and the differences in the substantive provisions of the Act, it is important
that the effect of these differences be thoroughly considered in determining what, if any, legislation is desirable.
Debates in Congress have indicated that many important interests view the suggested amendments on jurisdictional problems
as a means of amending the substantive provisions of the TaftHartley Act.
The employers appear to be principally interested in three objectives:
1. To make it possible for an individual to obtain injunctive
relief for a violation of the provisions of the Federal Act.
2. To permit states to impose such additional restrictions on
picketing and strikes as each state may think desirable, and to
permit state courts or administrative boards to enjoin violations
of such state acts.
3. To permit state laws to operate in the twilight zone of jurisdiction..
The unions' representatives on the other hand generally take
the position that the history of labor relations indicates that one
of the principle causes of bad labor relations in the past has been
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the power of state courts to issue temporary restraining orders and
injunctions.
They also take the position that it is extremely unfair to permit states to impose additional restrictions on labor unions which
are not contained in the Federal Act. The unions also point out that
many difficulties arise if the states courts and boards are permitted
to operate in the twilight zone.
As long as both employers and unions approach the problem of
the relative jurisdiction of State and Federal Government from the
standpoint of the advisability of substantive provisions of the Federal and State Acts, it is extremely difficult to see how much
progress can be made in clearly defining the respective fields of
jurisdiction. This approach does, however, point out that the basic
issue is not "states rights," because as was pointed out by several
witnesses in the hearings, if the basic issue was in fact "states
rights" it would logically follow that if a state desired to relax
some of the restrictions of the federal law it should be permitted
to do so.
The problems arising from the conflict in jurisdiction do not
seem to be as serious as some would have us believe. This is indicated by the Minnesota experience where Federal and State Boards
have been operating simultaneously for many years with no increase in labor difficulties caused by such operation. To the extent
that the conflict remains a problem, it is submitted that the following
steps should be taken:
1. Within the respective spheres of the Federal and State Governments the jurisdiction of each should be exclusive. Concurrent
jurisdiction gives rise to more problems than it solves. To permit
the state to operate in a field where the board has jurisdiction but
declines to exercise it also gives, rise to many problems. From the
standpoint of the public it is probably undesirable to leave a twilight zone in which certain industries are entirely unregulated.
From the standpoint of both employers and unions, however, who
are within the twilight zone, they are never quite sure as to which
law is applicable to them. It would, therefore, seem highly desirable
for Congress to indicate much more clearly than it has in the past,
the area in which it desires that the NLRB exercise jurisdiction.
2. The new jurisdictional policies of the NLRB, in which they
have declined to assert jurisdiction with respect to certain industries predominantly local in nature, is a move in the right direction. However, to minimize twilight zone problems jurisdictional
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policies should primarily be determined by Congress and not by
the NLRB.
3. To the extent that substantive amendments of either federal
or state law are desirable, the issues involved in such substantive
amendment should be met head on by Congress, and it should be
willing to accept the full responsibilities for the effects of such
amendments.
4. Every effort should be made to speed up the decisions of the
NLRB and to bring the administration of the NLRA a little closer
to the people involved in labor matters. Recently, extensive efforts
in these directions have been made by streamlining the procedure
and by giving additional authority to the regional director in representation cases. In the past, any attempts at decentralization have
met with vigorous protests from the National Board itself on two
grounds:
1. That decentralization might result in contrary rulings in different districts, and
2. That if authority was decentralized, an appeals procedure
would probably have to be established, which would in many cases
result in additional delays.
While both of these arguments have merit, the experience in
the United States with respect to our court system indicates that
there will be no great problem with respect to the variance of rules
between various districts which will not be solved by the appeals
procedure. With the respect to the possible delay, it is admitted that
wherever there is a desire on the part of either employer or union
to delay that they will be able to do so. However, means of delay
in the Act at the present time are just as serious. Experience has
shown that an appeal procedure will not be abused.
The experience in Minnesota indicates that there is only one
possible area in which concurrent jurisdiction would be feasible at
the present time, and that is with respect to the conciliation features
of our act. Most unions and employers who are subject to the
Federal Act still continue to use services of the State Labor Conciliator. It would seem that no serious problem would be raised by
a simple requirement that after a notice of dispute has been served
on the United States Mediation and Conciliation Service pursuant
to the provisions of the Federal Act that thereafter both employers
and unions shall have a duty to respond to meetings which are
called by the Conciliator.

